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Abstract 
Equipment and units in the hydrocarbon and chemical process industry are subject to 
several deterioration mechanisms that could lead to a loss of containment. This work 
presents an enhancement of a risk based inspection methodology earlier presented by 
Kallen (2002). This risk based inspection methodology uses a stochastic gamma function 
to model the materials deterioration rate. Using the prior knowledge of the deterioration 
rate and a Bayesian updating method, a posterior material deterioration model is found 
for two cases: perfect and imperfect inspections. Then, this material deterioration model 
is used to estimate the optimal inspection, replacement and failure times. 
Estimating inspection times depends on the material deterioration rate, age of the 
equipment, original material thickness, and the number of previous inspections that were 
carried on. The optimal inspection time aims to reduce the risk of failure due to 
deterioration mechanisms by maintaining the value of the equipment's damage factor as 
low as possible. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The accepted inspection plans are those which can maintain a safe level of risk for the 
inspected equipment, and this is what is called risk based inspection (RBI). In risk based 
inspection (RBI), risk due to equipment failure is used as a criterion to prioritize the 
inspection process. The risk caused by failure is a function of both the probability of 
failure and its consequences. Items with high risk of failure will take a high priority on 
the list of items to be inspected and maintained. The methodology of planning inspection 
and maintenance activities based on risk minimizes the probability of system failure and 
its consequences, improves the existing inspection and maintenance policies, and reduces 
the cost of inspecting and maintaining by eliminating unnecessary inspection and 
maintenance activities. 
Since the late 1980's several risk based inspection approaches and codes were 
developed (Ablitt and Speck, 2005). The literature review in chapter two outlines most of 
theses approaches and codes. 
The model used in this work is a quantitative risk based inspection approach. This 
model is a combination of a quantitative risk based inspection approach earlier proposed 
by Kallen (2002) and justified and used by Khan et al (2005) and Khan et al (2006), and 
an approach developed by the American Petroleum Institute (API) and presented in its 
base resource document API 581. Appling this model maintains a safe level of risk for 
the inspected equipment by keeping the equipments damage factor at its lowest possible 
value. 
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1.1 Objective of Work 
This work aims at improving and enhancing an earlier developed risk based 
inspection methodology by Kallen (2002) by combining it with another method 
developed by the American Petroleum Institute (API). The enhanced methodology can be 
used to design inspection plans which aim at reducing the risk of equipment failure 
caused by material deterioration. 
1.2 Methodology 
The risk based inspection methodology presented in this work uses a probabilistic 
model estimate the cumulative damage to the material of the component and update the 
estimated material deterioration model with available inspection data using Bayesian 
updating. 
A stochastic gamma function is used to model material deterioration based on the 
work of Kallen (2002); Kallen and Noortwijk (2004); Kallen and Noortwijk (2005); 
Khan, Haddara, and Battacharya (2005); and Khan et al. (2006). The stochastic gamma 
distribution is a continuous time process. One of its advantages is that it gives a non-
negative distribution that describes the deterioration process. Based on the established 
deterioration rate the optimal inspection, replacement, and failure times are estimated. 
Figure 1.1 depicts the overall framework of the used risk based inspection methodology 
in this work. 
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Divide the system into process components 
Select one component 
Identify all possible degradation mechanisms 
Select one degradation mechanism. 
Determine 
probability of failure 
Estimate the 
consequence 
Calculate the risk of failure of the identified 
deterioration mechanism 
Yes 
Calculate the cumulative 
risk of failure for the 
component 
Estimate expected 
inspection, 
replacement, and 
failure times. 
No 
Develop inspection plan for the system 
Consider 
another 
deterioration 
mechanism 
Figure 1.1: The overall framework of the RBI methodology 
4 
1.3 Organization of the Thesis 
The organization of this thesis is described as follows: 
The first chapter contains an introduction, states the objective of the work, and 
outlines the methodology used. The second chapter includes a literature review of the 
development of the various risk based methodologies, techniques, and software. The third 
chapter aims at giving background knowledge about the risk based inspection in general. 
It talks about the American Petroleum Institute ,(API) risk based inspection approach 
which can be applied at three different levels: qualitative, semi-quantitative, and 
quantitative risk based inspection. The fourth chapter illustrates the model used in this 
work to estimate the inspection, replacement, and failure times for process industry 
equipments. The fifth chapter contains two case studies which are used to illustrate the 
application of the risk based inspection model. The two cases studies are: a molecular 
sieve vessel, and a distillate hydrotreater reactor. Conclusions and recommendations are 
provided in the last chapter. 
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CHAPTER2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
6 
Detecting potential system failures through an inspection is an important activity in 
industry. Inspection and maintenance programs aim to reduce the probability of the 
unexpected failure. The failure of equipment can result in accidents which would have 
major consequences. These may involve toxic and flammable material, operation 
interruptions, or environmental catastrophes. Several codes and standards were 
developed to help the engineers with the prioritization of component inspections since 
the late 1980's (Ablitt and Speck, 2005). This chapter reviews the available risk based 
approaches for inspection and maintenance planning. 
Rasmussan, et al (1975) developed the basic seven tasks for the assessment of 
reactor safety. Event trees were used to analyze the damage likely to occur due to pipe 
breakage. Failure probability was investigated for 100 reactors per year. Failures 
investigated include the property damage, cancer fatalities, and early fatalities. 
Although risk concept was not employed for calculating failure probability of 
equipment in this work, it initiated the base for risk analysis to start playing a major role 
in equipment maintenance along with safety. 
Moghissi (1984) described risk analysis as a complex and logical process that 
must be refined by the devotion of time, effort and resources. Political and legal 
constraints were termed as uncertainty of risk value. According to Moghissi (1984), the 
importance of the cost impact, and cost/benefit analysis are the basis for developing 
optimized programs for component replacement and inspection. 
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Rettedal (1990) discussed the integration of structural reliability analysis and 
quantitative risk assessment. The integration is achieved by adopting two Bayesian 
approaches: classical Bayesian approach that estimates the true objective risk, and fully 
Bayesian approach where the risk is a way of expressing uncertainties of the occurrence 
of an accidental event. 
Vo et al (1990) developed a probabilistic risk assessment study for eight 
representative nuclear power plants. Failure probabilities were calculated based on 
historical data. The objectives of the study are to show the practicability of using risk 
based methods to develop plant specific inspection plans, to assess current in service 
inspection requirements for pressurized systems and to develop recommendations for 
improvements. 
In 1991, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) developed a risk 
based inspection guideline. ASME risk based inspection approach consisted of four 
steps: definition of the system, a qualitative risk assessment, a quantitative risk 
assessment, and development of inspection program (Wintel, Kenzie, Amphlett and 
Smalley 2001). 
In May 1993 the American Petroleum Institute (API) initiated a risk based 
inspection (RBI) project. The aim of the American Petroleum Institute (API) was to 
build an RBI methodology that uses risk as a base for prioritizing and managing 
inspection programs. The developed RBI methodology was published in 2000 as API 
581. Two years later a more generic recommended practice was published as API 580. 
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The RBI analysis can be carried out on three deferent levels; qualitative, semi-
quantitative, and quantitative risk based inspection. The qualitative approach uses 
engineering experience and judgment as the bases for the risk analysis. Therefore, the 
accuracy of the results in the qualitative RBI approach depends totally on the analyst's 
experience and background. Risk ratings in the qualitative approach are determined by 
categorizing the two elements of risk: likelihood and consequence. 
In the API qualitative RBI approach, risk ranking is achieved through a 5x5 matrix 
of likelihood and consequence. The likelihood five categories are ranked from 1 to 5 (1 
is the lowest, 5 is the highest). The consequence categories are ranked using the letters 
A toE (A is the lowest, E is the highest), (API 581, 2000). Similarly to the qualitative 
API approach the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) codes rank the 
risk using a 5x5 but with three modifications: 
1. The likelihood is ranked VL (very low), L (low), M (medium), H (high), and 
VH (very high) instead of numbers. 
2. The consequence is ranked VL (very low), L (low), M (medium), H (high), and 
VH (very high). 
3. The "Low Risk" region is extended to include "Very Low" consequence events, 
(Antaki, Monahon, and Cansler, 2005). 
The semi-quantitative risk assessment approaches have aspects derived from both 
quantitative and qualitative approaches. It combines the speed of the qualitative 
approach and the accuracy of the quantitative approach. The data required for the semi-
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quantitative approaches are mostly like the ones required for quantitative approaches 
with less details. The results are usually given in consequence and probability 
categories that may have numerical values to permit the calculation of risk. 
The API risk based inspection semi-quantitative approach presents the results in a 
5x5 risk matrix showing likelihood categories vs. consequence categories (API 581, 
2000). RIMAP' s (Risk based Inspection and Maintenance procedure for European 
industry) guidelines includes a semi-quantitative approach that defines risk as the 
combination of probability of failure (POF) and consequence of failure (COF) for a 
given scenario (Lee, Chang, Choi, and Kim, 2006). RIMAP distinguishes between two 
types of scenarios: worst case scenario and expected scenario. COF is another semi-
quantitative risk assessment approach. The COF methodology is based on API 580/581 
codes, ASME code, RIMAP. The COF code assesses the risk ranking and design the 
appropriate inspection plan in oil refinery, petrochemical, and nuclear power plants 
(Lee et al., 2006). 
A number of software packages were developed to implement the API semi-
quantitative approach of risk based inspection. Tischuk Enterprises (UK) Company has 
developed an integrated software system for implementation and management of semi-
quantitative RBI (Tischuk, 2002). Tischuk OCA addresses the results in a 3x3 risk 
matrix shows likelihood category vs. consequence category (Tischuk, 2002). Tischuk 
Risk Expert (T-Rex) another software developed by Tischuk Enterprises Company 
(Tischuk, 2003). The Health and Safety Executive of the United Kingdom sponsored 
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TWI (The Welding Institute) to develop a software system that implements the best 
practice of RBI .TWI's RISKWISE™ semi-quantitative RBI software system combines 
the recommendations of both HSE guidance document and API 581 (Ablitt and Speck, 
2005). DNV developed the RBI software "ORBIT +IDS". ORBIT +IDS software system 
deals with quantitative and semi-quantitative RBI analysis. ORBIT Onshore software 
system developed also by DNV, it can model any fluid if physical property data are 
available and it has a database of 1500 chemicals and about 1700 materials. ORBIT 
Onshore software is available in English, French and Chinese (Topalis, Alajmi, Toe, 
and Rao, 2006). 
Veswly, Belhadj, and Rezos (1994) used probabilistic risk assessment for 
maintenance prioritization applications. Two measures used to determine risk 
importance maintenance, minimal cutsets contribution and risk reduction. Using these 
measures, the importance of the maintenance based on the risk impact that would occur 
if maintenance were not carried out effectively can be determined, the basic events and 
their associated maintenances can be prioritized according to their risk level, and basic 
events having low risk and unimportant maintenances can be identified. 
Nessim and Stephens (1995) presented a risk based methodology that estimates 
the optimal maintenance interval for an aging hydrocarbon pipeline network. The 
presented risk based maintenance methodology consists of two main steps: to rank 
different segments of the pipeline according to priority for maintenance, and to select an 
optimal set of maintenance action for the chosen segments. 
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Nicholls (1995) developed a risk assessment code for a nuclear power station. The 
languages used in the code were PASCAL, ORACLE, and FORTRAN. The developed 
code includes: component database, failure modes, fault tree, event tree, probabilistic 
risk assessment analysis and documented results for the nuclear power plant. 
Vaurio (1995) presented a general procedure to optimize inspection and 
maintenance intervals of safety related systems and components. Optimizing inspection 
and maintenance intervals is done based on minimizing the cost under the condition that 
risk remains below a set criterion. Basic events modeled include component failures, 
common cause failures and human errors. 
Balkey, Art and Bosnk (1998) developed a risk based ranking methodology that 
includes probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) method. The developed methodology 
integrates nondestructive examination data, failure data, structural reliability, and 
probabilistic risk assessment. 
Hagemeijer and Kerkveld (1998) developed a risk based inspection methodology 
for pressurized systems. The methodology determines risk by evaluating the 
consequences and the probability of equipment failure. Probability of equipment failure 
is assessed by means of extrapolation for the future planned maintenance work to 
identify the corrective maintenance works. A qualitative consequence analysis is 
applied to filter subsequent analysis. The methodology aims optimize the inspection and 
maintenance based on minimizing the risk. 
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Hamly (1998) developed a risk ranked inspection recommendation procedure to 
prioritize repairs identified during equipment inspection. The equipments are prioritized 
based on severity index. Severity index is the combination of failure potential and its 
consequences. 
Kumar (1998) provided a holistic risk based approach. The approach presented 
is referred to as risk based maintenance where cost consequences are assessed 
quantitatively. This risk based maintenance approach improves the existing 
maintenance policy through optimal decision procedures in different phases of the risk 
cycle of a system. 
Ape land and A ven (2000) developed a risk based maintenance optimization 
(RBMO) approach. The optimal strategies can be determined by evaluating the 
relationship between the benefits associated with each maintenance alternative and its 
cost. The presented approach works in a probabilistic frame using a Bayesian approach. 
Brown and LeMay (2000) presented a risk based methodology for inspection and 
maintenance assessment. The proposed risk based methodology estimates probability of 
failure based on reliability concept. This risk based methodology used for hazardous 
release protection and prevention. Several cases were reviewed in which failures would 
be prevented if proper risk assessment procedures were applied. 
Nessim, Stephens, and Zimmerman (2000) presented a quantitative risk based 
integrity model for maintenance planning for offshore pipelines. Benefits associated 
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with different maintenance alternatives are quantified by calculating their impact on the 
likelihood of failure and risk level. 
V assiliadis and Pistikopoulas (2000) developed a risk based maintenance strategy 
that minimizes the environmental risk and increases the profitability in the process 
industry systems. Occurrence of unexpected events mechanism and the severity of its 
consequences are presented in the work. 
Dey (2001) presented a risk based methodology for inspection and maintenance. 
Appling the methodology helps to identify the right pipeline for inspection and 
maintenance policy; reduces the cost of inspecting and maintaining petroleum pipelines; 
reduces the time spent on inspection; and suggests efficient design and operation 
philosophies, construction methodology and logical insurance plans. 
Ponnambalam (2001) shown that the statistical and stochastic analyses can be 
used to integrate risk and reliability for system function design. A Bayesian model was 
used in this work estimate the risk. The advantages of utilizing available data and 
knowledge of experts in assigning probabilities in estimating risk to manage regulation 
of stream flow were demonstrated. The used procedure to analyze failure data consists 
of specifying an acceptable and unacceptable failure rates, and using a permitted 
number of failures as a control variable. 
Anderson (2002) discusses the implantation and applying of risk based inspection 
programs. The origin of risk based inspection, establishing the bases for defining the 
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risk, risk assessment process, key parameters of risk based inspection analysis, and risk 
based inspection implantation options were discussed. The author concluded that 
several methodologies are available to accomplish a successful implementation of risk 
based inspection programs, he stated that "sufficient risk based inspection studies are 
now complete on refineries and petrochemical that give good guidance on how these 
projects should be planned, initiated and implemented". 
Backlund and Hannu (2002) studied maintenance decisions based on risk analysis 
results. A case study involving a hydro power plant is presented. Maintenance 
decisions for this case study were developed based on three independent risk analyses. 
A comparison between these three analyses revealed major differences in performance 
and results. Based on the study it was concluded that there is a need for a quantitative 
risk analysis. 
Faber (2002) illustrated a theoretical framework for risk based inspection 
planning. The uncertainties of inspection measurement attributed to deterioration, 
physical uncertainties, statistical uncertainties, and model uncertainties were described. 
The physical uncertainties are associated with loading, environmental exposure, 
geometry and material properties. The statistical uncertainties arise from incomplete 
statistical information, e.g. due to smaller number of material tests. The model 
uncertainties are due to the mathematical approximation used to simplify the model. 
Kallen (2002) developed a probabilistic risk based inspection methodology. This 
methodology uses gamma stochastic deterioration process to model the corrosion 
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damage mechanism that used to develop safety optimal inspection plans. Cost functions 
associated with gamma process for modeling deterioration are developed. 
Martinez Gonzalez et al (2002) presented a quantitative integrity and risk 
assessment approach. The presented approach is used for maintenance planning m 
natural gas transmission pipelines. The approach provides a helpful tool to make 
operating decisions that guarantees risk reduction in terms of business interruption, 
environmental and property damage, and public and employee safety. 
Misewicz, Smith, Nessim, and Playdon (2002) developed a risk based integrity 
approach. The developed approach uses quantitative risk analysis to estimate the risk. 
This approach aims to select projects that fit within maintenance budget while providing 
risk reduction. 
Montgomery and Serratella (2002) discussed a holistic risk based maintenance 
approach to asset integrity management. The approach is developed based on proven 
risk assessment and reliability analysis methodologies, in addition to the need to have 
appropriate management systems. 
Jovanovic (2003) compared the current practices and trends in the area of risk 
based inspection (RBI) and risk based life management (RBLM) implemented in 
European and USA. Risk based life management (RBLM) is a concept that includes 
external damages, explosions and similar purely random causes. 
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Khan and Haddara (2003) presented a risk based maintenance methodology for 
designing an optimum inspection and maintenance programs. The methodology consists 
of three parts: risk estimation, risk evaluation and maintenance planning. This 
methodology was applied to a heating, ventilation and air-conditioning system. 
Fujiyama et al (2004) developed a risk based maintenance (RBM) system for 
steam turbine plants coupled with inspection systems. The developed risk based 
maintenance system makes use of the field failure and inspection database accumulated 
over 30 years. Determining the optimum maintenance plan is depends on the simulated 
scenarios described through component breakdown trees, life cycle event trees and risk 
functions. 
Kallen and Noortwijk (2004) developed a risk based inspection technique used in 
optimal inspection and replacement decisions for multiple failure modes. The 
deterioration model is presented along with the cost functions. The cost functions were 
extended to include multiple failure modes. The combined deterioration and cost 
function model is illustrated by an example considering an elbow in a pipeline that is 
susceptible to thinning due to corrosion. 
Khan and Haddara (2004a) discussed a risk based maintenance (RBM) 
methodology. The proposed methodology developed based on integrating risk 
assessment strategies and reliability approaches. The risk based maintenance 
methodology is used to answer two questions: The maintenance program should be 
scheduled for which equipment? and when the maintenance should be scheduled? 
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Khan and Haddara (2004b) discussed a comprehensive and quantitative 
methodology for maintenance planning based on risk. This methodology is developed to 
obtain an optimum maintenance schedule that minimizes the probability of system 
failure and its consequences. A case study, which exemplifies the use of the 
methodology to an ethylene oxide production facility, is discussed. 
Krishnasamy (2004) implemented a quantitative risk based maintenance approach 
to a hydrothermal power generation plant. This quantitative approach is comprised of 
three modules: risk assessment module, risk evaluation module, and maintenance 
planning module. Risk assessment module studies the occurrence of failures in 
equipment and the severity of their consequences. Failure data are collected from the 
historical failure data of the Newfoundland and Labrador hydrothermal power station 
over a period of twelve years, and then it was modeled using Weibull and Exponential 
distributions. Risk evaluation module determines an acceptable risk criterion and 
identifies the major systems and subsystems that have a risk higher than the acceptable 
risk. Maintenance planning module estimates the optimal maintenance interval that 
reduces risk level. It was concluded that, risk based maintenance prioritizes the systems 
for maintenance planning, improves the existing maintenance policies, minimizes the 
consequences (safety, economic and environmental) related to a system failure, and 
provides coast-effective means for maintenance. 
Horikawa, Yoshikawa, Takasu (2004) presented a newly developed risk based 
maintenance system. This system is used to describe the structural integrity of buried 
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pipeline based on the risk index. The benefits of the developed risk based maintenance 
system as a means of structural integrity assessment is discussed in this paper. The 
paper also discussed the features of the quantitative risk evaluation approach. 
Brickstad (2005) studied five different Structural Reliability Models (SRMs) 
conducted in the frame of the European Project NURBIM (Nuclear Risk Based 
Inspection Methodology for passive components). Probabilities of failure for pipes of 
small, medium and large diameters were evaluated for 40 years. Two damage 
mechanisms were considered: fatigue and stress corrosion crack. Five different software 
were applied to fifteen parameters to calculate failure probabilities for 40 years. 
Conley (2005) presented the application of risk based inspection (RBI) assessment 
technology. This risk based inspection approach was applied to ammonia storage to 
analyze the hazards presented by corrosion or other ongoing degrading mechanisms. 
The presented approach is a qualitative risk based inspection approach. Risk was 
presented in a risk matrix in this work. In the risk matrix the consequences were 
measured in terms of the area that would be affected by fire or explosion if flammables 
are released. 
Kallen and Noortwijk (2005) presented a risk based inspection (RBI) technique 
that develops cost and safety optimal inspection plans. Bayesian decision model is used 
to determine these optimal inspection plans under uncertain deterioration. The presented 
risk based inspection technique uses the gamma stochastic process to model the 
corrosion damage mechanism and Bayes' theorem to update prior knowledge over the 
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corrosion rate with imperfect wall thickness measurements. A periodic inspection and 
replacement policy which minimizes the expected average costs per year is found. An 
example using actual plant data of a pressurized steel vessel is presented. 
Krishnasamy, Khan and Haddara (2005) developed maintenance strategy based on 
risk for a power generating plant. The risk based maintenance methodology consists of 
four parts, identification of scope, risk assessment, risk evaluation and maintenance 
planning. Applying this risk based maintenance methodology results in risk reduction, 
increases the reliability of equipment, and reduces the cost of maintenance. 
Noori and Price (2005) implemented the semi-quantitative risk based inspection 
approach developed by the American Petroleum Institute (API) on furnace tubes. The 
calculated risk was addressed in a 5x5 risk matrix to target the tubes with the highest 
risk category to take the priority in planning the inspection program. Inspection 
intervals then developed based on the technical model subfactor (TMSF) according to 
the API code. Questions according to these inspection intervals were presented. 
Straub and Faber (2005) presented a new risk based inspection approach. The 
presented approach is an integral approach that considers the entire systems in 
inspection planning, while most of the risk based inspection approach focus exclusively 
on individual components or have considered system effects in a very simplified 
manner only, because it is not possible to identify cost optimal solutions if the various 
types of functional and statistical dependencies in the systems are not explicitly 
addressed especially for large engineering systems. The paper discussed the various 
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aspects of dependencies in the systems, decision problems encountered in inspection 
and maintenance planning of structural systems, and how these decision problems can 
be consistently represented by decision theoretical models. 
Khan, Haddara, and Battacharya (2006) developed a risk based methodology for 
integrity and inspection modeling (RBIIM).The methodology presents quantitative risk 
based inspection approaches that use the gamma stochastic process to model the 
corrosion damage mechanism and Bayes' theorem to update prior knowledge over the 
corrosion rate. RBIIM finds a periodic inspection and replacement policy that 
minimizes the expected average costs per year. 
Tien, Hwang, and Tsai (2007) developed a new risk based inspection model. The 
model consists of two parts: the first part is a risk based inspection system, and the 
second is a risk based piping inspection guideline model. The model is designed to 
analyze damage factors, damage models, and potential damage positions of piping in 
the petrochemical plants. The objective of developing the model is to provide inspection 
related personnel with the optimal planning tools for piping inspections; therefore, it 
enables effective predictions of potential piping risks and enhances the degree of safety 
in plant operations in the petrochemical industries. 
Khan and Howard (2007) presented a simplified practical approach for the use of 
statistical tools for inspection planning and integrity assessment. The study is focused 
on corrosion related material degradation of piping on an offshore production facility. 
The application of the approach is demonstrated using 7 years past inspection data. The 
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case studies presented herein illustrate the benefits to be gained by applying well-
established statistical methods to the analysis of inspection data, amongst which are: 
quantification of inspection findings, the ability to specify the extent of inspection 
required for the defined level of confidence, and the use of limited inspection data to 
infer the condition of inspected areas under similar exposure conditions to those 
inspected. Further, this approach can be integrated with risk based inspection and 
integrity assessment methods thereby improving the value of these assessments. 
The above literature review provides a clear understanding of the risk based 
inspection and maintenance in process and allied industries. It has been observed that 
most of the industry practiced approaches are qualitative; whereas API has 
recommended guidelines for semi quantitative and/or quantitative risk based inspection. 
What is lacking in the current literature is a simplified quantitative approach that is easy 
to use, rigorous, reliable, and follows the API recommended practice for RBI. After 
reviewing available models and methods for risk based inspection and maintenance 
planning, stochastic model proposed by Kallen (2002) and API approach (API 581, 
2000) has been chosen for subsequent study. Kallen (2002) model has earlier used by 
Khan et al. (2006). In present study this model has been integrated with API risk based 
inspection planning method. The model was chosen to benefit from both the rigor of the 
API risk based inspection approach and the relia~ility of the stochastic model presented 
by Kallen (2002). Details of risk based inspection modeling, Kallen model, and 
integration of Kallen model with API approach and their application has been presented 
in subsequent chapters. 
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CHAPTER3 
RISK BASED INSPECTION 
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3.1 Definition of RBI 
Risk based inspection (RBI) is a method that uses risk as a basis for prioritizing 
and managing inspection plans (API 580, 2002). A RBI program determines what 
incident could occur (consequence) if equipment fails, and how likely it could 
happen. The objectives of the RBI program are: 
1. Using the concept of risk to target inspection and maintenance resources that 
can have the greatest effect in reducing risk. 
2. To systematically reduce the occurrence and consequences of unplanned 
failures. 
3. To reduce the cost of unproductive inspections. 
Risk based inspection requires to undertake a risk analysis for the systems and 
equipments under consideration. The form of this analysis can vary considerably 
depending on the RBI approach. However, the risk analysis in all approaches should 
contain the following stages: 
• Identification of potential deterioration mechanisms and modes of failure. 
• Assessment of the probability of failure from each mechanism/mode. 
• Assessment of the consequences resulting from equipment failure. 
• Determination of the risks from equipment failure. 
• Risk ranking and categorization. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates a simplified block diagram of risk based inspection process. 
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Figure 3.1 A simplified block diagram of RBI process (API 580, 2002). 
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3.2 The Concept of Risk 
Risk is defined as the probability of an event occurring during a time period of 
interest with adverse consequence. 
The probability of failure is defined as the frequency with which a specified 
failure event would be expected to occur in a given period of operation, normally one 
year. 
The consequence of failure through the unintentional release of stored energy and 
hazardous material is the potential of harm. Risk analysis should concern of two 
basic consequence categories. The first consequence category is related to the 
potential harm to the Health and Safety of employees and/or the public, and to the 
environment from the release of flammable and/or toxic materials. The second 
consequence category is an economical one; it is concerned with consequence of 
failure on the business, such as the costs of lost production, and repair and 
replacement of equipment. 
The risk of failure in mathematical terms is defined as: 
Risk= Probability x Consequence ... (3-1) 
For a specific scenario (deterioration mechanism) the risk equation can be 
stated as: 
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Risks =POFs x COFs ... (3-2) 
Where 
Risks is risk of a specific scenario, 
POFs is the probability of failure of a specific scenario/deterioration mechanism. 
COFs is the consequence of that scenario. 
The total risk of an item is the sum of the risks for all possible scenarios/ all 
degradation mechanisms. 
Risk Item = L Risks ... (3-3) 
3 .2.1 Probability of failure 
The probability analysis calculates the probability of a specific adverse 
consequence resulting due to deterioration mechanisms. 
The probability of failure analysis should adopt all deterioration mechanisms to 
which the studied equipment is susceptible. According to API 580 (2002), four major 
deterioration mechanisms are observed in the hydrocarbon process industry: 
1. Thinning. 
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2. Stress corrosion cracking. 
3. Metallurgical and environmental. 
4. Mechanical. 
In determining the probability of failure the effectiveness of the maintenance 
and inspection programs should be taken in consideration along with the 
deterioration susceptibility and rate. 
Various methods can be applied to determine the probability of failure. These 
include qualitative, semi-quantitative and quantitative methods. The qualitative 
approach in determining the probability of failure relies on the judgment and 
experience of an expert. 
The semi-quantitative methods that determine the probability of failure are: 
• Failure rates for generic classes of equipment based on historical data. 
• Failure rates for generic equipment classes modified by equipment specific 
factors. 
The above semi-quantitative methods can be used quantitatively. In addition, the 
following methods are used in the quantitative approach in determining the 
probability of failure: 
• Fault tree and/or probabilistic risk analysis, 
• Structural reliability analysis- (e.g. probabilistic fatigue and fracture). 
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In this work the probability of failure is estimated quantitatively. A probabilistic 
material degradation is estimated through applying a mathematical function that 
models the deterioration rate of the material. 
3.2.1 Consequence of failure 
The consequence analysis in a RBI program estimates what might be expected to 
happen if a failure occurs in an assessed equipment item. It should focus on the 
subsequent events that can cause death, or harm to the employees and the general 
population, and economical losses. 
In assessing the effects of the release of fluid resulting from failure of pressure 
systems and systems containing hazardous materials all the relevant factors should 
be included: 
• Composition of the contained fluid. 
• Physical and chemical properties of the material contained in the system. 
• Potential leak area considering the mode of failure and pipe/vessel size. 
• Release rate of mass/energy. 
• Mitigation systems such as water curtains and secondary containments. 
• Measures for detection of the leak and the means for its isolation. 
• Total amount of fluid available for release. 
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• The final phase of the fluid when it release into the atmosphere. 
• The dispersal characteristics of the fluid at the site. 
• Possible subsequent events to release, such as fire and/or explosion. 
The subsequent consequences resulting from the release depend on the type of 
fluid and the energy contained in the system. The events of flammable release, steam 
and hot gas release, toxic release, high pressure gas release and missile could 
endanger Health and Safety. The potential for one or a combination of these events 
should be determined. 
The events of flammable materials release, hot gas release, and high pressure gas 
release generally leads to fire and/or explosion consequences. The results from fire 
and explosion consequences are given as effected area. Injuries and death from fires 
and direct blast effects of explosions can be estimated using probit analysis. Damage 
for common structures can be estimated depending on the overpressure generated in 
the explosion. For more details see Crowl and Louvar "Chemical process safety 
fundamentals with applications". 
Missiles are the debris results from explosion occurring in a confined vessel or 
structure. Missiles can cause injury and death to people, and damage to structures. 
The maximum horizontal range that missiles could reach can be estimated from a 
figure developed by Clancey (1972). 
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Toxic release can cause serious accidents if the toxic material released quickly 
and in significant enough quantities. Toxic release and dispersion models estimate 
the effects of a release on the plant and community environment. These models 
study a wide variety of parameters: 
• Wind speed. 
• Atmospheric stability which is related to vertical mixing of the toxic 
material and the air. 
• Ground conditions which affect the mechanical mixing of the toxic 
material in the air at the surface, and wind profile. 
• Height of the release above ground level. 
• The buoyancy and momentum of the initial material released. 
3.3 Guidelines on Risk Based Inspection 
3.3.1 Health and Safety Executive RBI 
The Health and Safety Executive guideline issued by the Hazardous Installations 
Directorate (HID) describes a risk based approach to planned plant inspection 
(ASME, 1999). 
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Health and Safety Executive (HSE) issued the report 'Best practice for risk based 
inspection as a part of plant integrity management' in the year 2001. The report 
contains regulations and guidelines on both risk assessment and risk based 
inspection, the application of risk based inspection, plant data requirements, team 
competencies, the development of inspection plans and overall management of the 
RBI process. A case study of RBI practice, an audit tool to assist the evaluation of 
the RBI process, techniques to identify accident scenarios, types of deterioration 
mechanisms of pressurized systems and software packages supporting RPI of 
pressure systems and containments are given in the appendices. According to the 
welding institute publication, TWI (2005), the objective of issuing the Health and 
Safety Executive risk based inspection report is to provide guidelines for risk-based 
inspection planning of 
• Pressure equipment and systems that are subject to the requirements for in-
service examination under the Pressure Systems Safety Regulations 2000 
(PSSR). 
• Equipment and systems containing hazardous materials that are inspected as 
a means to comply with the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 
(COMAH). 
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3.3 .2 The American Society of Mechanical Engineers RBI 
In 1991, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) extended the 
risk assessment and developed a general guideline that gives a general overview of 
the principles involved in risk based inspection. 
According to Win tel et al. (200 1 ), the recommended process to rank or classify 
systems for inspection and to develop the strategy of inspection in ASME risk based 
inspection approach includes: 
a. Definition of the system. 
b. A Qualitative Risk Assessment. 
c. A Quantitative Risk Analysis. 
d. Development of Inspection Program. 
The qualitative risk assessment enables the individual plant items within the 
system to be prioritized. This initial assessment involves: 
a. Defining the failure modes and causes, 
b. Identifying the consequences, 
c. Estimating risk levels, 
d. Ranking the subsystems. 
e. Ranking the individual components based on risk level. 
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Then the quantitative risk analysis is applied to the individual components of the 
system. The quantitative risk analysis would capture information from the qualitative 
risk assessment and assign probabilities and consequences of failure for each 
component. 
Development of the inspection program is the next stage, where the inspection 
strategies of technique and frequency are evaluated, performed and then the results 
are assessed to update the state of knowledge for the next inspection. 
3.3 .3 The American Petroleum Institute RBI 
The America Petroleum Institute (API) risk based inspection program aims to 
define and measure the level of risk associated with an item; evaluate safety, 
environmental and business interruption risks; and reduce risk of failure by the 
effective use of inspection resources. The America Petroleum Institute (API) has 
established a number of documents on risk based inspection like API 580, API 581, 
API 510, API 570, and API 653. API 580 provides a general guideline for risk based 
inspection. API 581 is an i!'ldustry specific document that can be applied to the 
petroleum and chemical process areas. API 510 provides a risk based inspection code 
for pressure vessel systems. API 570 is a piping inspection code. API 653 provides 
tank inspection, repair, and alteration and construction codes. 
34 
The level of risk is assessed by a quantitative analysis generally applied after an 
initial qualitative analysis has established those plant items for further analysis. The 
inspection program is then developed to reduce that risk. 
3.4 RBI Approaches 
The RBI program can be applied qualitatively, semi-quantitatively, or 
quantitatively. Choosing the appropriate RBI type or approach depends on multiple 
variables such as available resources and data, complexity of process and facilities, 
study frame time, and the objective of the study. 
3 .4.1 Qualitative RBI 
The qualitative risk analysis is based basically on engineering judgment and 
experience made by the informed personnel and relevant experts in the RBI team. 
The likelihood and consequences of failure are expressed descriptively and in 
relative terms (e.g. very unlikely, possible, reasonably probable and probable for 
LOF, high, moderate, low for COF). 
The qualitative approach is an ordered and prescribed process where judgments 
should reflect the consensus opinion of the team. It is assisted if a standard procedure 
is followed for each item. Risks within a qualitative approach are usually presented 
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within in a risk matrix as combinations of the likelihood and consequences. The 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) and the American Petroleum 
Institute (API) have developed two similar qualitative approaches that assigns risk 
ranking in a 5x5 risk matrix. Figure 3.2 shows risk estimating the API qualitative 
RBI approach. 
Likelihood 
Category 
Damage 
Consequence 
Category 
Qualitative RBI 
5x5 Risk Matrix 
Figure 3.2 API Qualitative RBI Approach 
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Health 
Consequence 
Category 
The likelihood category in the qualitative API RBI approach is assigned by 
evaluating six factors, the sum of these six factors assigens the overall likelihood 
factor. The likelihood cateroy is estimated based on the over all likelihood factor. 
The six factors that establishes the likelihood category are: 
1- The liklihood equipment factor (EF) which concerns about the number of 
components in the unit, it is strongly influenced by the number of equipment 
items in the studied unit. 
2- The likelihood damage factor (DF), it is a measure of the risk related to known 
damage mechanisms. 
3- The likelihood inspection factor (IF); it measures the effectiveness of the 
current inspection program to identify the anticipated damage mechanisms in 
the unit. 
4- The likelihood condition factor (CCF) is related to the effectiveness of plant 
maintenance and housekeeping efforts. 
5- The likelihood process factor (PF) accounts the potential abnormal operations 
or upset conditions to result in initiating events that could lead to a loss of 
containment. 
6- The likelihood mechanical design factor (MDF) studies certain aspects of the 
design of the operating equipment. 
According to the API 581(2000), the consequence analysis for the qualitative API 
RBI approach determines two major consequence factors: a damage cosequence 
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factor and a health consequence factor. The damage cosequence factor studies the 
flammable consequence of failure. The health consequence factor studies the 
consequence of a contained material release on human health through studying the 
toxic consequences. The consequence category will consider the higest rating from 
either the damage or the health consequences. 
The damage consequence category is estimated from the sum of six factors that 
determines the magnitude of fire and explosion hazard: 
1- The chemical factor (CF) measures the chemical's inherent tendency to ignite. 
2- The quantity factor (QF) estimates the largest amount of material which could 
be released from a unit in a single scenario. 
3- The consequence state factor gives an indication of the fluid's tendency to 
vaporize and disperse when released to invironment. 
4- The autoignition factor (AF) account the ignition probability of a fluid 
processed at a temperature above its autoignition temperature. 
5- The pressure factor (PRF) represents the fluid's tendency to be released 
quickly. 
6- The credit factor (CRF) determines the safety features engineered into the unit 
through the summation of several subfactors of engineered systems in place 
which can reduce the damage from an event. 
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The health consequnse category is derived from the combination of four factors 
which express the degree of a potential toxic hazard in th unit, these factors are: 
1- The toxic quantity factor (TQF) measures both the quantity and the toxicity of 
a material. 
2- The dispersibility factor (DIF) represents the ability of a material to disperse. 
3- The credit factor (CRF) accounts the safety features engineered into the unit. 
4- The population factor (PPF) estimates the number of people that can 
potentially be affected by a toxic release event. 
The likelihood category rating and the highest rating from the two consequence 
categories are placed for each unit within a 5x5 risk matrix to give an indication of 
the risk level for each unit. The qualitative 5x5 risk matrix is shown in figure3.3. 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
A B c D E 
Conseque>nre Category 
Figure 3.3 Qualitative Risk Matrix (API 580, 2002). 
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3.4.2 Semi-Quantitative RBI 
The semi-quantitative risk based inspection approach has aspects derived from 
both the qualitative and quantitative approaches. It is designed to obtain the major 
benefits of both of the qualitative and quantitative approaches; it has the speed of the 
qualitative approach and the rigor of the quantitative approach (API 580, 2002). 
The risk analysis for the API semi-quantitative risk based inspection approach is 
a straight forward assignment of the likelihood of failure and its consequences to 
their proper categories and placing them in the 5x5 risk matrix. Figure 3.4 shows the 
risk matrix for the API semi-quantitative approach. Two consequences are covered 
in the API semi-quantitative risk based inspection approach: flammable 
consequences and toxic consequences (API 581, 2000). Figure 3.5 shows the risk 
evaluation process of the semi-quantitative RBI approach based on API codes. 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
A B c D 
Consequence Category 
Figure 3.4 The API semi-quantitative approach Risk Matrix (API 581, 2000). 
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Figure 3.5 Tpe semi-quantitative RBI approach based on API codes 
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3 .4.3 Quantitative RBI 
The quantitative RBI approach uses logic models depicting combination of 
events that could result in severe accidents and physical models representing the 
consequences of these events. The logic models that estimates the likelihood of 
failure generally consists of event trees and fault trees analysis. 
The likelihood of failure analysis in the API RBI approach is carried out using 
generic failure frequency as the starting point. This generic failure frequency is then 
modified by two terms the equipment modification factor and the management 
systems evaluation factor. According to API 581 (2000) the adjusted failure 
frequency is given by: 
Frequency adjusted = Frequency generic X FE X F M ... (3-4) 
Where: 
Frequencygeneric is the generic failure frequency. 
FE is the equipment modification factor. 
FM is the management systems evaluation factor. 
The generic failure frequencies are estimated using records from plants, 
literature sources, past reports, and commercial data base. Generic failure 
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frequencies are assumed to follow a log-normal distribution. A detailed generic data 
base, and developed values of the generic failure for each type of equipment and 
each diameter of piping is presented in the API 581 (2000). 
The equipment modification factor examines the specific conditions of each 
equipment item that have a major influence on the likelihood of failure of that 
equipment item. According to API 581 (2000), these specific conditions are 
categorized in four subfactors: 
• The technical module subfactor that used to assess the effect of specific 
failure mechanisms on the likelihood of failure. Two categories are 
evaluated in the technical module subfactor: deterioration rate and 
effectiveness of the inspection program. 
• The universal subfactor which covers the conditions that equally affect all 
equipment items in the plant. The universal subfactor is composed of the 
following three elements: plant condition, cold weather operation, and 
seismic activity. 
• The mechanical subfactor that addresses conditions mainly related to the 
design of the equipment item and its fabrication. The mechanical 
subfactor includes five elements: equipment complexity, construction 
code, life cycle of equipment, safety factor, and vibration monitoring 
element. 
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• Process influences subfactor which can affect equipment integrity. 
Process influences subfactor includes three elements: continuity of the 
process, stability of the process, and relief valves. 
The management systems evaluation factor measures the influence of the 
facility's safety management system on the likelihhod of failure of equipment items 
and the plant integrity. 
The quantitative API RBI approach covers four different consequences: 
a. Flammable consequences. 
b. Toxic consequences. 
c. Environmental consequences. 
d. Business interruption consequences. 
The results from both flammable and toxic consequences are given as effected 
area. Where, the environmental and business interruption consequences are 
calculated as economic loss. Figure 3.4 presents the consequence of failure 
estimation process based on API approach. The consequence of failure is estimated 
almost in the same way for the semi-quantitative and the quantitative approaches, 
with less detail while applying the semi-quantitative approach. 
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Figure 3.4: COF estimation process based on the semi-quantitative/ 
quantitative API RBI approaches (API 581, 2000). 
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3.5 Advantages of Applying RBI 
According to Patel (2005), applying the risk based inspection methodology based 
on the American Petroleum Institute guidelines has the following advantages: 
• Improving the health and safety management. 
• A void unnecessary inspection: Inspection intervals are based on the 
risks associated with the equipment and therefore inspection 
personnel can spend most of their time on the high risk areas and less 
time in the low risk areas. 
• Saves cost: Equipment with no history of problems and no anticipated 
problems is inspected on longer intervals rather than just inspecting 
every few years as is the case with a time-based inspection program. 
• Information from inspections on one piece of equipment can be 
utilized in determining the inspection intervals and scopes for similar 
equipment. 
• The RBI program is totally dynamic: risks are updated after 
inspections or even the inspection of similar equipment, changes to 
process conditions or even if new information becomes available. 
Any of the above may result in a change in inspection frequencies or 
changes to the inspection scopes. 
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• The methods used to determine the inspection intervals and inspection 
scopes are documented and repeatable. 
• Increases plant availability and optimum repair and replacement 
scheduling. 
• Extends plant and equipment life. 
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CHAPTER4 
THE RBI MODEL 
4.1 Model Concept 
The risk based inspection model presented in this work is a probabilistic model 
that combines a risk based inspection approach developed by the American 
Petroleum Institute API and published in its base resource document API 581 (2000), 
and a risk based inspection model developed by Kallen (2002). The American 
Petroleum Institute risk based inspection approach is developed to estimate the 
optimal inspection time using the prior knowledge of the average material corrosion 
(degradation) rate. The approach is based on the assumption that the material 
corrosion rate will remain constant with time which is unlikely to occur. Several 
factors are likely to affect the rate of material degradation e.g. the aging of the 
equipment, new degradation mechanisms may start affecting the system. To 
compensate for this effect, the API risk based inspection approach designs the 
inspection programs in time intervals that vary from four to six years with different 
inspection levels depending on the inspected system and type of equipment The API 
risk based inspection approach differentiates between different inspections levels 
where different inspection techniques are applied: highly effective, usually effective, 
fairly effective, and poorly effective inspections. By combining the American 
Petroleum Institute risk based inspection approach with the risk based inspection 
model developed by Kallen, the prior knowledge of the average corrosion rate can be 
effectively updated and converted to a density function that shows the change in the 
corrosion rate with time using a stochastic gamma model and Bayesian updating. 
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The main advantage of combining the API risk based inspection approach with the 
risk based inspection model developed by Kallen is that the new model gives more 
reliable inspection intervals. The resulting inspection intervals are not too short like 
the inspection intervals obtained from applying the risk based inspection approach 
developed by the American Petroleum Institute, so unnecessary inspections are 
avoided. Nor they are too long so the risk of failure due to deterioration mechanisms 
will exceed the acceptable risk level. Another advantage of combining the American 
Petroleum Institute risk based inspection approach with the risk based inspection 
model developed by Kallen is the ability to predict optimal inspection time as well as 
failure times. 
The new risk based inspection model uses state functions to model the 
cumulative damage to the material of the component and update this model with 
available inspection data using Bayesian updating. The model aims at developing an 
optimum inspection strategy for the equipment. Figure 4.1 depicts the overall 
framework suggested for the application of this model. The framework includes five 
stages: identification of equipment to be analyzed, detecting degradation 
mechanisms for each component, calculation of risk of failure of each component, 
finding the optimal inspection interval for each component, development of a 
comprehensive policy for plant inspection. 
Risk as previously stated has two components likelihood and consequence. The 
likelihood of failure is estimated using a stochastic gamma model. The gamma 
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stochastic process is used to model the existing degradation mechanisms and to 
update the degradation model to extrapolate the expected degradation in the future 
based on previous inspection data. The consequence analysis is estimated using the 
damage rate to find the optimal expected replacement and failure times. The 
expected inspection time calculated keeps the damage factor as low as possible in a 
range that keeps the process within acceptable risk. Figure 4.2 represents the risk 
analysis methodology. 
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Figure 4.1 Framework for the RBI model methodology 
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Figure 4.2 Risk analysis methodology 
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4.2 Deterioration Mechanisms and Failure Probability 
Deterioration mechanisms are defined as deterioration types that could lead to a 
loss of contaminant. Identifying the appropriate deterioration for all equipment 
included in a risk based inspection study is essential to the effectiveness and quality 
of the RBI evaluation. The probability of failure due to a deterioration mechanism is 
a function of the rate of deterioration, the probability of detecting all deterioration 
mechanisms through inspection, the deterioration type, and the tolerance of 
equipment to the type of deterioration. According to API 580 (2002), four major 
deterioration mechanisms are observed in the hydrocarbon and chemical process 
industry: 
a. Thinning. 
b. Stress corrosion cracking. 
c. Metallurgical and environmental. 
d. Mechanical. 
4.2.1 Thinning Deterioration 
Thinning is the most common damage mechanism that causes leak in process 
component system. Thinning can be defined as the loss of material due corrosion. 
The effects of thinning can be determined from measuring the original thickness of 
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the material and its current thickness, corrosion allowance and corrosion rate. 
Thinning includes a number of damage mechanisms that can cause loss of material 
from internal or external surfaces. Thinning can be caused by either a general 
corrosion or localized corrosion. General thinning is usually observed in carbon steel 
or copper, while localized thinning and pitting usually occurs in stainless steels and 
higher alloy materials. 
1. General thinning. According to API 580 (2002) includes the following 
degradation mechanisms: 
• Amine Corrosion: generally caused by desorbed acid gases or 
amine deterioration products. 
• Atmospheric Corrosion: General uniform corrosion occurs under 
atmospheric conditions where carbon steel is converted to iron 
dioxide. 
• Corrosion Under Insulation: A specific case of atmospheric 
corrosion. 
• High Temperature Sulfidic Corrosion: General uniform corrosion 
occurs in all locations with temperature above 450°F with the 
present of 2% sulfur or more. 
• Oxidation: General uniform corrosion where metal is converted to 
a metal oxide above specific temperatures. 
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• Soil Corrosion: highly observed in tank bottoms and underground 
piping. 
2. Localized thinning. According to API 580 (2002) includes the following 
degradation mechanisms: 
• Ammonia Bisulfide Corrosion: Localized corrosion in carbon 
steel and admiralty brass. Formed by catalytic cracking, coking, 
hydrocracking, amine treating and sour water effluent and gas 
separation systems. 
• Carbon dioxide Corrosion: happens often in refinery steam 
condensate systems, hydrogen plants, and vapor recovery section 
of the catalytic cracking unit. 
• Galvanic Corrosion: Localized corrosion occurs when two metals 
are joined and exposed to an electrolyte. 
• Hydrochloric Acid Corrosion: Localized corrosion in carbon and 
low alloy steel. 
• Hydrofluoric Acid Corrosion: Localized corros1on that occurs 
often in Hydrofluoric acid alkylation units. 
• Naphthenic Acid Corrosion: Localized corrosion attacks steel 
alloys when the organic acids are condensed in the range of 350°F 
to 750°F. 
• Phenol Corrosion: Localized carrion usually happens in heavy oil 
and dewaxing plants. 
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• Phosphoric Acid corrosion: Localized corrosion generally occurs 
in water treatment plants. 
The state function (g thinning) can be applied on thinning that cause material loss 
on the internal or external surfaces of the component. The state function is based on 
the material resistance minus the applied stress. Kallen (2002) defined the state 
function as 
g thinning = material resistance - applied stress ... ( 4-1) 
=S(l- C:M)-( ~=~) ... (4-2) 
Where 
S is residual stress in MPa, 
Cis corrosion rate in mm/yr, 
Pis operating pressure in bar, 
D is the diameter of the component in mm, 
d is the material thickness in mm, 
and !1t is a time increment. 
Kallen (2002) defined the residual stress S as 
S = min { 1.1 (YS+ TS)/2, TS} 
Where 
YS is the material yield strength in MPa. 
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... (4-3) 
TS is the material tensile strength in MPa. 
The material tensile and yield strengths are determined by the material grade. 
One of the most common systems for the classification of material grade is 
developed by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) and (ASTM) 
the American Society for Testing and Materials (Wintel, Kenzie, Amphlett, and 
Smalley, 2001). Knowing the material grade is a key to find all material properties, 
including the tensile and the yield strengths. 
The state function (gthinning) is a measure of the ability of the material to resist 
failure due to thinning. It can be used to determine the time at which a component is 
expected to fail. As long as gthinning >0 the unit is considered to function safely. At the 
limit state when gthinning = 0 the unit fails. 
4.2.2 Stress Corrosion Cracking Deterioration 
Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) is the cracking of normally ductile metals 
induced from the combined influence of tensile stress and a corrosive environment 
especially at elevated temperature. Stress corrosion cracking is a dangerous type of 
failure as it can occur without an externally applied load or at loads significantly 
below yield stress. Thus, catastrophic failure can occur without significant 
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deformation or obvious deterioration of the component. Pitting is commonly 
associated with stress corrosion cracking phenomena (API 581, 2000). 
Stress corrosion cracking comprises different cracking mechanisms such as 
amine cracking, ammonia cracking, caustic cracking, chloride cracking (CISCC), 
hydrogen induced cracking (HIC), sulfide stress cracking (SSC), hydrogen blistering, 
hydrogen cyanide cracking, and polythionic acid cracking (API 581, 2000). 
Amine cracking is cracking of a metal under the combined actions of corrosion 
and tensile stress in environments containing aqueous alkanolamine solution at 
elevated temperatures. Carbon steels and low alloy steels are susceptible to amine 
cracking. Amine cracking usually occurs in amine treating units, where amine is 
used in gas treatment to remove dissolved C02 and H2S acid gases (API 581, 2000). 
Ammonia cracking is generally present in ammonia production and handling 
units. Ammonia cracking causes damage to carbon steel and copper zinc alloys (API 
580, 2002). 
Caustic cracking is cracking of a metal under the combined actions of corrosion 
and tensile stress caused by caustic (sodium or potassium hydroxide) at elevated 
temperatures. It is primarily initiated in carbon steel equipment, primarily due to 
fabrication or residual stress (API 581, 2000). 
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Chloride stress corrosion is one of the most important forms of stress corrosion 
that concerns the nuclear industry. Chloride stress corrosion occurs in austenitic 
stainless steel under tensile stress in the presence of oxygen, chloride ions, and high 
temperature. It is thought to start with chromium carbide deposits along grain 
boundaries that leave the metal open to corrosion. This form of corrosion is 
controlled by maintaining low chloride ion and oxygen content in the environment 
and use of low carbon steels (API 580, 2002). 
Hydrogen-induced cracking (HIC) can occur in carbon and low alloy steel 
materials exposed to aqueous environments containing hydrogen sulfide (H2S). 
Deterioration of the material properties is caused when nascent hydrogen atoms (H0 ) 
diffuses into the material and reacts with other nascent hydrogen atoms to form 
molecular hydrogen gas in inclusion of the steel (API 581, 2000). 
Sulfide stress cracking (SSC) occurs in carbon and low alloy steel materials 
exposed to aqueous environments containing hydrogen sulfide. SSC usually occurs 
more readily in high hardness steels in hard weld deposits or heat effected zones of 
lower strength steels. Deterioration takes the form of cracking in improperly stress 
relived equipments (API 581, 2000). 
Hydrogen blistering is a type of hydrogen-induced failure produced when 
hydrogen atoms enter low-strength steels that have macroscopic defects. It occurs 
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usually in sour environments and it does not cause a brittle failure but it can produce 
rupture or leakages (API 580, 2002). 
Water solutions of hydrogen cyanide cause stress-cracking of carbon steels under 
stress even at room temperature and in dilute solution, and water solutions of 
hydrogen cyanide containing sulfuric acid as a stabilizer severely corrode steel above 
40 degrees C (API 580, 2002). 
Polythionic acid cracking (PTA) is the cracking of austenitic stainless steels in 
the sensitized condition in the presence of polythionic acid in wet ambient 
conditions. Polythionic acid cracking causes damage in the petroleum refining 
industry, particularly in catalytic cracking, desulfurizer, hydrocracker, and catalytic 
reforming processes (API 580, 2002). 
Susceptibility of equipment to stress corrosion cracking depends on five main 
factors: 
1. Material of construction. 
2. Stress corrosion cracking mechanisms. 
3. Operating temperature and pressure. 
4. Concentration of key process corrosives such as pH. 
5. Fabrication variables such as post weld heat treatment. 
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Paris and Erdogan (1963) developed a crack rate law for use in linear elastic 
homogeneous materials. Paris law is only applicable in the propagation phase; it 
assumes the crack advances when any stress is applied (Grant, 2001). Based on Paris 
low the stress corrosion cracking state function uses a resistance minus stress model. 
Kallen (2002) defined the stress corrosion cracking state function as 
g sec = material resistance - applied stress 
Where 
K1c is the material fracture toughness in MPa --./mm, 
Y is a dimensionless geometric factor, 
Pis operating pressure in bar, 
D is the diameter of the component in mm, 
d is the material thickness in mm, 
S is residual stress in MPa, 
and A is the crack depth in mm. 
... (4-4) 
... (4-5) 
The material fracture toughness for stainless steel equals to 300 Ksi (in) 112 , and 
for carbon and low alloy steel can be calculated using the following equation 
(Kallen, 2002): 
K 1c = Minimum{33.2 + 2.806exp{0.02(T + 100)},200}ksi~ ... (4-6) 
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where T is the operating temperature. 
According to Kallen (2002), the crack depth A can be obtained using the 
following equation: 
A= l + R ua ... ( 4-7) 
Where 
l is the crack length in mm 
R ua is the crank length to depth ratio. 
According to Kallen (2002), the crack length is determined by: 
... (4-8) 
Where 
C is the crack growth rate. 
/). t is the time since the service start of the component. 
4.2.3 Metallurgical and Environmental Deterioration 
Metallurgical and environmental failure is the mechanical and/or physical 
property deterioration of the metal due to exposure to the process environment. 
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According to API 580 (2002), carburization, decarburization, high temperature 
hydrogen attack, grain growth, graphitization, sigma phase embrittlement, 885°F 
embrittlement, temper embrittlement, liquid metal embrittlement, , and metal dusting 
are examples of metallurgical and environmental failure. 
Carburization is the carbon diffusion into the surface of steel due to interactions 
with the environment at elevated temperatures. The increased carbon content leads to 
an increase in the hardenability of ferritic steels and some stainless steels (API 580, 
2002). 
Decarburization is the decrease of the carbon content from the surface of a 
ferrous alloy as a result of heating in a medium that reacts with carbon. The 
decreasing carbon content causes a degradation of these properties, as the hardness 
as well as the strength decrease. However, the elongation of the metal when 
subjected to a tensile stress increases (API 580, 2002). 
HTHA damage can take two forms, internal decarburization and fissuring from 
the accumulation of methane gas at the carbide matrix interface and surface 
decarburization from the reaction of the atomic hydrogen with carbides at or near the 
surface (API 581, 2000). 
High temperature hydrogen attack (HTHA) occurs in carbon and low alloy steels 
in the presence of high temperature and hydrogen. HTHA occurs as a result of 
atomic hydrogen diffusing through the steel and reacting with carbides in the 
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microstructure. Two reactions associated with HTHA. The first reaction is the 
dissociation of hydrogen molecule to form atomic hydrogen. This reaction occurs 
more readily at high temperatures and high hydrogen partial pressure. The second 
reaction occurs between atomic hydrogen and the metal carbides . 
Hz 
............ 2H 
"" 
4H+MC ............ CH4+M 
"""' 
Grain growth occurs when steels are heated above a certain temperature, 
beginning about 1100°F for carbon steel and most pronounced at 1350°F. Austenitic 
stainless steels and high nickel chromium alloys are subjected to grain growth when 
it is heated to above 1650°F. Grain growth is usually observed in furnace tubes and 
equipments susceptible to run-away reactions (API 580, 2002). 
Graphitization occurs when the normal pearlite grains in steels decompose into 
soft weak ferrite grains and graphite nodules usually due to long term exposure in the 
825°F to 1400°F range. It occurs in fluid catalytic cracking (FCC) units (API 580, 
2002). 
Sigma phase is a non-magnetic intermetallic phase produces loss of ductility, 
toughness and is generally strain intolerant at temperatures under. Sigma phase 
embrittlement occurs in ferritic and austenitic stainless steels with more than 17% 
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chromium during exposure at 1000°F- 1500°F for extended time periods (API 580, 
2002). 
885°F embrittlement causes a loss of ambient temperature ductility. 885°F 
embrittlement occurs after aging of ferritic stainless steels exposed to temperature 
range of 650°F to 1000°F (API 580, 2002). 
Temper embrittlement occurs in low alloy steels during exposure to temperature 
range of 700°F - 1050°F for a long time period. Temper embrittlement produces a 
loss in toughness that can lead to a brittle fracture (API 580, 2002) .. 
Liquid metal embrittlement is a corrosive degradation forms catastrophic brittle 
failure of normally ductile metals such as stainless steel copper based alloy in the 
presence of certain liquid metals such as mercury, zinc, lead, cadmium (API 580, 
2002) .. 
Metal dusting is a highly localized carburization of steels in environments 
containing mixtures of hydrogen, methane, carbon monoxide, C02, and light 
hydrocarbons in the temperature range of 900°F- 1500°F (API 580, 2002). 
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4.2.4 Mechanical Deterioration 
According to API 580 (2002), the most common mechanical deterioration 
mechanisms are corrosion-fatigue, mechanical and thermal fatigue; brittle fracture; 
cavitation; stress/creep rupture; and tensile overload. 
Corrosion-fatigue is a form of fatigue results from the combined action of an 
alternating or cycling stresses and a corrosive environment where pitting corrosion 
promotes the mechanical fatigue process. The fatigue process causes rupture of the 
protective passive film, upon which corrosion is accelerated (API 580, 2002). 
Mechanical fatigue causes failure of a component by cracking after the continued 
application of cyclic stress which exceeds the material's endurance limit. If 
mechanical fatigue develops until catastrophic failure it usually involves nucleation 
of permanent structural damage, nucleation of microcracks, growth and coalescence 
of microcracks to form a dominant crack, propagation of the dominant crack, and at 
the end unstable fracture (API 580, 2002). 
Thermal fatigue is a process cyclic change in stress in a material due to cyclic 
change in temperature. Coke drums, bypass valves and piping with heavy weld 
reinforcement on reactors in cyclic temperature service are subject to thermal fatigue 
(API 580, 2002). 
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Brittle fracture is a rapid run of cracks through a stressed material. It causes loss 
of ductility wherein the steel is referred to as having low notch toughness or poor 
impact strength (API 580, 2002). 
Cavitations occur when a fluid's operational pressure drops below its vapor 
pressure causing gas pockets and bubbles to form and collapse. This can occur in 
what can be a rather explosive and dramatic fashion (API 580, 2002). 
Stress rupture is failure of a metal at elevated temperatures under applied stress 
below its normal yield strength (API 580, 2002). 
Creep is a high temperature mechanism wherein continuous plastic deformation 
of a metal takes place while under stress below the normal yield strength. The rate of 
creep damage is a function of the rp.aterial properties and the exposure time, 
exposure temperature and the applied load (stress). When evaluating components 
that operate under high stresses or temperatures, creep is usually a concern to 
engineers and metallurgists. Creep is not necessarily a failure mode, but is instead a 
damage mechanism (API 580, 2002). 
Tensile overloading occurs when loads exceeds the maximum allowable or 
permitted by design are applied to the equipment (API 580, 2002). 
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4.3 Gamma Deterioration Process 
Although the degradation of the material mechanisms are determined to be 
deterministic, there is a level of uncertainty associated with some of their variables. 
Therefore, these variables have to be considered random and the material 
degradation process is expected to be a stochastic process (Kallen, 2002). 
According to Kallen (2002), the stochastic process{X (t): t 2: 0} is a continuous 
time process that consists of a collection of random variables, where t is interpreted 
as time and X (t) is the state of the process at timet. 
Here X (t) is defined as the amount of material deterioration at time t. A non-
negative distribution is needed to describe the deterioration process; the probability 
of a negative increment would be interpreted as a sudden increase in the construction 
material quality. Therefore, a gamma distribution is used to describe the material 
deterioration process (Kallen, 2002). 
Kallen (2002) defined the gamma density with shape parameter a > 0 and scale 
parameter f3 > 0 as: 
Ga(x I a, {J) = -- - exp{- flx} pa ( 1 )-a+l 
r(a) x for x2:0 ... (4-9) 
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The continuous time gamma process {X (t): t 2: 0} with shape function at> 0, t2: 
0 and scale parameter> 0 has the following properties: 
1. X (0) = 0 with probability 1, 
2. X(r)-X(t)-Ga(a(r-t),b) forall r>t2:0, 
3. X (t) has independent increment. 
According to Kallen (2002), the probability density function of X (t) is given by: 
f X(t)(x) = Ga (xlat, b) ... (4-10) 
The mean and variance of X (t) are given by: 
E(X(t )) = : t ... (4-11) 
Var (X (t)) = -;- t ... ( 4-12) 
b 
For the cumulative deterioration function X (t) at time t, E (X (t)) = f1. t and 
Var( X (t)) = cr2 t. Therefore, Kallen (2002) defined fl. and cr2 as: 
a a 2 
- = J1 and - = a 
b b2 
... (4-13) 
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According to Kallen (2002), the probability density function for the cumulative 
deterioration function X (t) is given by 
... (4-14) 
In order to keep the method practical and easy to use for the plant engineer the 
standard deviation cr relative to the mean ll should be fixed through the use of a 
coefficient of variation v. Kallen (2002) defined the coefficient of variation vas: 
v=al 11 ... (4-15) 
Using this relationship, Kallen (2002) rewrite the gamma density function for 
corrosion as: 
/X(t)(X) = Ga(xi~·~J 
V JlV 
I 
( 1 J;z 
= JlV z (x );z -I exp {- _x_} 
r( ;, ) JiV' ... (4-16) 
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4.4 Prior and Posterior Deterioration Distributions 
The prior knowledge of the average degradation rate (JJ.) can be effectively 
updated using the results of previous inspections. Kallen (2002), Kallen and 
Noortwijk (2003), and Khan et a/.(2005) used Bayes's theorem to do this updating. 
The updating modeling involves selecting an appropriate prior, and Bayesian 
updating of the prior using new inspection data which can be applied for the two 
cases: perfect or imperfect inspection data. 
Kallen (2002) defined the prior density !r(f.L \ x) as: 
;r(J.L \ x) = -00---'l ('--x \--'-J.L-'--);r--'-(J.L-'-) -
Jz(x \ f.L );r(J.L )df.L 
J.l=O 
... (4-17) 
where p is the mean corrosion rate and l(x \ f.1) is the likelihood of a 
measurement x given fl. 
Kallen (2002) defined the posterior density in the case of multiple perfect 
inspections as: 
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Where a is the shape parameter of the gamma function, fJ is the scale 
parameter of the gamma function, and v is the coefficient of variation 
According to Kallen (2002), the posterior of multiple imperfect inspections is 
given by: 
p(f.Li)__!__ fnkca(dk -min{oj,dk ~L\t2k ,~J 
1,. ) N j=t Jl v f.LV P\f-l· \ y = ------------:---------'-=-
' f p(pJ-1 £Ilk Ga(dk- min{oJ ,dk ~L\t2k ,~J 
i=t N j=t Jl V f.LV 
... (4-19) 
Where 
8k = £k- £k-I ... (4-20) 
... (4-21) 
And 
... (4-22) 
4.5 Replacement and Failure Probabilities 
According to Kallen and Noortwijk (2004), the cumulative deterioration gamma 
distribution at time t is given by: 
Fx(t) (x) = Pr{X(t) S: x} 
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x fJ a(t) f Ba(r)-J exp (- fJB )dB 
B=o r(a (t )) 
r (a (t ), f3 x ) 
= ..:..__:'----;~~~ 
r (a (t )) for x~O. ... (4-23) 
According to Kallen and Noortwijk (2004), the term P(a, X)= r~(~)) for a> 0 
and x 2: 0 is the incomplete gamma function. 
For a nonrandomized inspection plan, the time interval between two inspections 
1s 11k years and inspections are carried out at times jl1k (j2:1). The amount of 
deterioration at time j 11k is represented by the simplified notation X j = X (jl1k). 
The probability of no replacement after an inspection at time (j-1) 11k and a 
failure at time jl1k according to Kallen and Noortwijk (2004) is given by: 
Where r and s represents the replacement and failure conditions respectively, and 0 < 
r <s. 
Using the fact that the increments in the gamma process are independent, Kallen 
and Noortwijk (2004) defined the probability of no replacement after an inspection at 
time (j-1) 11k and a failure at timej/1k as: 
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r 00 
Pr {x 1_1 :::; r, X 1 > s }= f f fxi_ 1 (B)Fxrxi_ 1 (¢ )d¢dB 
0=0 !p=s-(} 
s 
= Fxi_
1 
(r)- Fxi (s )+ J fxj_ 1 Fxrxi_1 (s- B)dB ... (4-25) 
O=r 
Kallen and Noortwijk (2004) defined the probability of X(t) passing the 
replacement condition level during the inspection interval (j-1 j) as: 
... (4-26) 
Using these results, all the possible probabilities can be easily determined. 
4.6 Reducing Risk through Inspection 
The risk of system failure due to material deterioration mechanisms is achieved 
through building a posterior material degradation rate for both cases perfect and 
imperfect inspection based on the prior knowledge of the damage rate in the material 
of construction. Now the inspection time is chosen so that the risk is maintained to 
have the minimum possible value. 
The American petroleum institute API in its base resource document API 581 
(2000) has built an approach of inspection planning that aims to have an inspection 
program keeps the risk of damage due to deterioration mechanisms as low as 
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possible through maintaining a low value of the damage factor. The approach can be 
applied to pressurized vessel systems in both cases of thinning and stress corrosion 
cracking deterioration mechanisms. The approach differentiates between different 
inspection levels where different inspection techniques are applied: highly effective, 
usually effective, fairly effective, and poorly effective inspections. The highly 
effective inspection can correctly identify the anticipated in-service damage in nearly 
every case. It can identify the anticipated in-service damage mechanisms with ninety 
percent efficiency. The assessment of general corrosion in the highly effective 
inspection is done by complete internal visual examination coupled with ultrasonic 
thickness measurements. 
According to API 581 (2000) usually effective inspections can correctly identify 
the actual damage state most of the time. It can identify the anticipated in-service 
damage mechanisms with 70% efficiency. The assessment of general corrosion 
during inspections is done by partial internal visual examination coupled with 
ultrasonic thickness measurements. Fairly effective inspections can correctly identify 
the true damage state about half of the time. The assessment of general corrosion in 
fairly effective inspections is done by external spot ultrasonic thickness 
measurements. Less effective inspection methods do not provide information that 
can correctly identify the true damage state. Damage identification efficiency in such 
cases are less than33%. 
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According to API 581 (2000) applying the risk reducing approach of inspection 
planning is carried out following four steps: 
1. Calculate the ratio arlt. 
The ratio ar/t represents time in current service (a) times the corrosion rate (r) 
divided by the original material thickness (t). This ratio can be calculated easily; the 
original material thickness is a known value, and the corrosion rate with time is 
estimated using the stochastic gamma deterioration model. The gamma function 
models the material corrosion rate by developing a prior and a posterior density 
function for the material deterioration. The gamma model, and the prior and the 
posterior density functions are given in sections 4.3 and 4.4. 
2. Calculate the over-design factor. 
The over design factor is a correction factor that will be applied to the damage 
factor. According to API 581 (2000), the over-design factor is calculated using the 
following formula: 
f original 
Over-design factor= -----''-----
t original - C .A· 
Where 
toriginal is the original material thickness. 
C.A. is the corrosion allowance. 
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... (4-27) 
The over design factor can be also determined by calculating the ratio between 
the designed pressure and operating pressure. 
3. Estimate the correction factor 
The correction factor is estimated based on the value of the over-design factor. 
Table 4.1 illustrates the values of the correction factor. It is necessary to estimate the 
correction factor because the damage sub-factor estimated from the chart is based on 
materials with 25% corrosion allowance. 
Table 4.1 Correction factor 
Over-design Factor Correction 
Factor 
<1.1 2.0 
1.1-1.5 1.0 
>1.5 0.5 
4. Determine the damage factor. 
The damage factor can be determined from the damage factor chart that is given 
by the API 581 (2000). Figure 4.3 shows the change in the damage factor value when 
carrying a number of inspections for the case of having a usually effective 
inspection. After finding the damage sub-factor value using figure 4.3 it is multiplied 
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with the correction factor. It should be noted that the correction factor should not be 
applied to damage sub-factors of one. 
Figure 4.3: Damage factor for different inspection times. 
5. Find the appropriate inspection time. 
The appropriate inspection time is the time which keeps the damage factor as low 
as possible. According to API 581 (2000) damage factors should be usually kept 
close to one by inspection activities of a moderate extent. Damage factor values 
exceeding ten should be avoided. 
79 
The following example illustrates the methodology of estimating the damage 
sub-factor: A pressure vessel with an original wall thickness of 25 mm is subjected 
to a localized thinning with a corrosion rate of 0.143 mrnfyear. The corrosion 
allowance for this vessel is 6.5 mm. Determine the optimal inspection interval for 
this vessel knowing that it was in-service since 2000, and no previous inspections 
were carried on? 
Solution: 
1. Calculate the ratio ar/t. 
a= equipment age= 7 years. 
r =corrosion rate= 0.143 mrnfyear. 
t = original thickness = 25 mm. 
ar = 7x0.143 =0.04 
t 25 
2. Calculate the over-design factor. 
t original 
Over-design factor= -----''------
t original - C .A· 
__ 2_5_= 1.35 
25-6.5 
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3. Estimate the correction factor 
Using table 3.1; for an over-design factor value between 1.1 and 4.5 the 
correction factor equals to one. 
4. Determine the damage sub-factor. 
Using figure 4.3; for 0 number of inspections and ar/t equals to 0.04, the damage 
sub-factor equals to 1. 
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CHAPTERS 
CASE STUDIES 
The risk based inspection model described in chapter four is used to determine the 
optimal inspection, replacement, and failure times for two cases of study: molecular sieve 
vessel, and distillate hydrotreater reactor. The two cases of study are adopted from Geary 
(2002). 
5.1 Case 1: Molecular Sieve Vessel 
The molecular sieve vessel commissioned in 1982 under the design standard BS5500. 
The molecular sieve vessel has the following dimensions: 2374mm diameter, 16000 mm 
length. The maximum designed temperature equals to 350°C, and the minimum designed 
temperature equals to -62°C. The maximum operating temperature equals to 320°C, and 
the minimum operating temperature equals to ooc. The maximum designed pressure is 
121 barg, the minimum designed pressure is 0 barg, the maximum operating pressure is 
115 barg, and the normal operating pressure is 110 barg. Three inspections were carried 
on the molecular sieve vessel in the years 1986, 1992, and 2000. Through theses 
inspections the following damage mechanisms were observed: pitting corrosion, 
hydrogen induced cracking and sulphide SCC (Geary, 2002). These types of damage 
mechanisms are listed in the stress corrosion cracking deterioration mechanism. The case 
study data for the molecular sieve vessel is shown in table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1: Molecular sieve vessel 
Component type 
Material Type 
Service start 
Initial material thickness 
Drum diameter 
Tensile strength 
Yield strength 
Operating pressure 
Corrosion rate 
Corrosion Allowance 
Inspections carried on previously 
Vessel 
Low temperature Carbon steel 
Grade BS 1501-225-490B-LT62 
1982 
20mm * 
2374mm 
448.16 MPa 
206.84 MPa 
110 bar 
0.1 mm/yr ** 
4.0mm 
1986: 19.9 mm wall thickness** 
1992 : 19.1 mm wall thickness** 
2000 : 18.2 mm wall thickness** 
*The value of the material thickness is changed to give a realistic value of the failure time. 
** These values were assumed since it was not mentioned clearly in Geary (2002). It was estimated after carrying 
sensitivity analysis that studies the effect of changing the input data like wall thickness and corrosion rate on the 
optimal replacement and failure times. The sensitivity analysis is provided in Appendix B. 
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Finding the optimal inspection time according to the API approach concerns with 
maintaining the risk of failure for the inspected equipment item in a safe level risk, it 
does focus on keeping the equipment damage factor near to one and try to avoid damage 
factor values of ten or more. In order to do so, the steps illustrated in section 4.6 should 
be followed. The first step is to calculate the ratio ar/t where: a is the equipment age, r is 
the corrosion rate, and tis the original material thickness. Now the need of the gamma 
function rises up to estimate the material corrosion rate behavior with the increasing age 
of the equipment. 
The stochastic gamma function described in section 4.3 is used to generate the prior 
and posterior deterioration mechanism functions which are used to find the ratio ar/t, 
where the assumed effective deterioration mechanism in this case study is stress 
corrosion cracking. The prior density function is given by equation ( 4-17), the posterior 
density for a multiple perfect inspections is given by equation ( 4-18), and the posterior 
density for a multiple imperfect inspections is given by equation (4-19). 
For more details about the prior and posterior density functions please see chapter 
four. The MATLAB code used to estimate the prior and posterior density functions for 
this case study is given in Appendix A. The prior and posterior density functions for 
2000 simulations with measurement error of 0.3 times of standard deviation are shown in 
figure 5.1. 
85 
' 
' 
' ---------~ 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' I 
---------, 
- prior density 
- posterior 1 perf. insp. 
- posterior1 imp. insp. 
, , - posterior2imp. insp. 
--------:----------~-------- posterior3imp. insp. 
' ' ~--~~------~--~ 
' ' -------~----------~---------~---------~----------~--------
1 I I I I 
I I I I I 
' I 
' I I I I I 
- .. --- -- -,---- - -- -- - r- -- .. -- - - - 1--- .. - --- .. '"'I- -- .. - - - .... - r -- - ...... - .. 
' I 
' I I I I I 
--------,----------r---------,---------~----------r--------
1 ' 
' ' 
' 
' 
' ' I I I I I 
...... - ........ , ........ - .. - .. -""I"' .. - .............. , .......... - ...... ., .................. - r .............. .. 
0 I I 
' ' 
' -------·----------~---------~---------~----------~--------
' ' 
' 
Figure 5. 1: Prior and posterior densities for perfect and imperfect inspections (result of 
probability analysis). 
After finding the prior and posterior deterioration mechanism functions, the ratio ar/t 
is estimated. Five hundred simulations where done to estimate the ratio ar/t. The 
MATLAB code used to estimate ar/t values while the equipment becoming older for this 
case study is given in Appendix A. Figure 5.2 show the estimated ratio ar/t with the 
increase in equipment age. 
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Figure 5.2 ar/t values (estimated using expression) with the increase in equipment age 
Now the second step according to the API approach is to calculate the over-design 
factor. The over-design factor is estimated by: 
t original Over-design factor= __ __;;;....._ _ _ 
t original - C .A. 
= 20/ (20-4) = 1.25 
The third step according to the API 581(2000) is to estimate the correction factor. The 
correction factor is estimated based on the over design factor using table 4.1. It is found 
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from the table that, for an over-design factor value between 1.1 and 1.5 the correction 
factor equals to one. So, the correction value is equal to one in this case study. 
The fourth step according to the API approach is to estimate the material damage 
factor. A figure that shows the damage factor for different number of inspections is 
provided in section 4.6. The MATLAB code developed to estimate the change in damage 
factor with time is provided in appendix A. Figure 5.3 shows the change in the damage 
factor with time. 
Figure 5.3 Change in the damage factor (estimated using expression) with time. 
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The last step in the API approach is to find the optimal inspection time. From figure 
5.3, it is clear that the damage factor for the molecular sieve vessel material starts to 
increase after fifteen years, so the inspection should be carried on at that time. The 
optimal inspection time is found to be after 15.3 years. 
By combining the API approach with the stochastic gamma model approach 
developed by Kallen (2002), we can go further more to find the expected replacement 
and failure times. Replacement and failure probabilities are provided in section 4.5. The 
MA TLAB code for the molecular sieve vessel case study which is provided in appendix 
A calculates the optimal replacement and failure times for 500 simulations. It was found 
that the expected replacement and failure times are found to be 40.50yr and 199.0yr., 
respectively. 
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5.2 Case 2: Distillate Hydrotreater Reactor 
The distillate hydrotreater reactor commissioned in 1988. Two inspections were 
carried on the distillate hydrotreater reactor in the years 1992 and 2002. The case study 
data for the distillate hydrotreater reactor is shown in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4: Distillate hydrotreater reactor 
Component type 
Material Type 
Service start 
Initial material thickness 
Drum diameter 
Tensile strength 
Yield strength 
Operating pressure (inlet) 
Operating pressure (outlet) 
Corrosion rate 
Corrosion Allowance 
Vessel 
Low alloy steel 
1988 
40 mm· 
3977 mm 
420 MPa 
350 MPa 
59 Kg/cm2 
36 Kg/cm2 
0.19 mm/yr ** 
6.0mm ** 
90 
. Inspections carried on previously 1992: 38.9 mm wall thickness 
2002: 37.5 mm wall thickness 
*The value of the material thickness is changed to give a realistic value of the failure time. 
•• These values were assumed since it was not mentioned clearly in Geary (2002). It was estimated after carrying 
sensitivity analysis that studies the effect of changing the input data like wall thickness and corrosion rate on the 
optimal replacement and failure times. The sensitivity analysis is provided in Appendix B. 
Several damage mechanisms are assumed to be active like: H2 corrosion, H2S 
corrosion, high temperature hydrogen attack, and SCC (Geary, 2002). Most of these 
damage mechanisms are listed in the stress corrosion cracking deterioration mechanism. 
Finding the optimal inspection time according to the API approach comes in five 
steps. The first step is to calculate the ratio ar/t where. The API approach finds this ratio 
by taking an average value for the corrosion rate and estimating that this value will 
remain constant with time. Now after combining the API approach with the probabilistic 
approach developed by Kallen (2002), the gamma function is used to estimate the 
material corrosion rate behavior with the increasing age of the equipment for n number of 
simulations which gives more accurate results. 
The stochastic gamma function described in section 4.3 is used to generate the prior 
and posterior deterioration mechanism functions which are used to find the ratio ar/t. 
More details about the prior and posterior density functions and how they are developed 
please see chapter four. The MA TLAB code used to estimate the prior and posterior 
density functions for this case study is given in Appendix A. The prior and posterior 
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density functions for 2000 simulations with measurement error of 0.3 times of standard 
deviation are shown in figure 5.4. 
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Figure 5.4: Prior and posterior densities for imperfect inspections (result of 
probability analysis). 
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After finding the prior and posterior deterioration mechanism functions, the ratio ar/t 
is estimated. Five hundred simulations where done to estimate the ratio arlt. The 
MATLAB code used to estimate ar/t values while the equipment becoming older for this 
case study is given in Appendix A. Figure 5.5 show the estimated ratio ar/t with the 
increase in equipment age. 
Figure 5.5 ar/t values (estimated using expression) with time 
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Now the second step according to the API approach is to calculate the over-design 
factor. The over-design factor is estimated by: 
t original 
Over-design factor = -----='-----
t original - C .A· 
= 40/ (40-6) = 1.18 
The third step according to the API 581(2000) is to estimate the correction factor. The 
correction factor is estimated based on the over design factor using table 4.1. It is found 
from the table that, for an over-design factor value between 1.1 and 1.5 the correction 
factor equals to one. So, the correction value is equal to one in this case study. 
The fourth step according to the API approach is to estimate the material damage 
factor. The figure that shows the damage factor for different number of inspections is 
provided in section 4.6. The MATLAB code developed to estimate the change in damage 
factor while the equipment becoming older is provided in appendix A. Figure 5.6 shows 
the change in the damage factor with the equipment age. 
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Figure 5.6: Change in the damage factor (estimated using expression) with the 
equipment age. 
The last step in the API approach is to find the optimal inspection time. From figure 
5.6, it is clear that the damage factor for the distillate hydrotreator reactor material starts 
to increase when the equipment age exceeds 40 years which means after 21 years, so the 
inspection should be carried on at that time. The optimal inspection time is found to be 
after 21.88 years. The damage factor change with time is shown in figure 5.7. 
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Figure 5.7: Change in the damage factor (estimated using expression) with time. 
By combining the API approach with the stochastic gamma model approach 
developed by Kallen (2002), we can go further more to find the expected replacement 
and failure times. Replacement and failure probabilities are provided in section 4.5. The 
MATLAB code for the molecular sieve vessel case study which is provided in appendix 
A calculates the optimal replacement and failure times for 500 simulations. It was found 
that the expected replacement and failure times are found to be 32.25 years and 209.91 
years, respectively. 
96 
97 
CHAPTER6 
DISCUSSION & 
CONCLUSIONS 
Inspection refers to the planning, implementation and valuation of examinations to 
determine the physical and metallurgical condition of an equipment item (Wintel et al, 
2001). Inspection is an initiator for actions such as the repair or replacement of 
deteriorating equipment, or change to the operating conditions. 
Risk based inspection is a logical and structured process of planning and evaluation. 
Risk based inspection involves the planning of an inspection on the basis of the 
information obtained from a risk analysis for equipment items (Wintel et al, 2001). The 
objective of the risk analysis is to identify the potential degradation mechanisms and 
threats to the integrity of the equipment, and to assess the consequences and risks of 
failure. The information and associated uncertainties captured from the risk analysis 
about potential deterioration are used to develop an integrity management strategy and 
appropriate inspection plan. The inspection plan targets the high risk equipment and aims 
to detect potential degradation before the equipment been threatened. 
Risk based inspection programs can be implemented on three different levels: 
qualitative, semi quantitative, and quantitative. The qualitative risk based inspection 
approach uses engineering experience and judgment as the bases for the risk analysis. 
The risk analysis for the qualitative risk based inspection approach is a straight forward 
assignment of the likelihood of failure and its consequences to their proper categories and 
placing them in the risk matrix. The semi-quantitative risk assessment approach combines 
aspects derived from both quantitative and qualitative approaches; it has the speed of the 
qualitative approach and the rigor of the quantitative approach. Risk ranking in the semi-
quantitative risk based inspection is achieved through a risk matrix of failure probability 
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and its consequence. The quantitative risk assessment approaches uses logic models 
evaluated probabilistically to provide a quantitative insight to identify the risk index. 
These models depicts combinations of the probability of occurring of events that results 
in sever accidents and its consequences. Estimating the probability of failure in the 
quantitative risk assessment approaches depends basically on historical failure data. 
Another way in estimating the probability of failure is based on reliability concept. 
Choosing the appropriate risk based inspection approach depends on the available 
resources and data, complexity of process and facilities, study frame time, and the 
objective of the study. Despite the used approach, risk based inspection program deals 
with four basic risk categories: flammable events which can cause damage through 
thermal radiation and blast overpressure, risk of release of toxic materials, environmental 
risk, and economic risk. 
The process of risk based inspection forms a part of an integrated strategy for 
managing the integrity of the systems and equipment of the installation as a whole. Risk 
based inspection aims to manage the likelihood and consequences of failure at an 
acceptable level, thus avoid unreasonable risks of harm to people and the environment 
and increase the operational safety of a process plant; increases the plant availability; and 
reduces the direct inspection cost of the plant by avoiding unnecessary inspection and 
maintenance actions. 
The key element in planning inspection based on carrying a risk assessment is the 
damage rate. Therefore, the risk based inspection program should take account of all 
deterioration mechanisms that can cause damage to equipment items. 
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This study presents a quantitative risk-based inspection model that combines a risk-
based inspection program modeled by Kallen (2002) and a risk-based inspection program 
developed by the American Petroleum Institute (API). This probabilistic risk based 
inspection model uses a stochastic model instead of a deterministic model to evaluate the 
cumulative damage to the material of component. It uses a gamma distribution to model 
the material degradation and a Bayesian updating. The gamma distribution used to model 
two main deterioration mechanisms: thinning and stress corrosion cracking; however, the 
gamma model needs to be expanded to model all deterioration mechanisms. The gamma 
distribution seems to describe the material degradation process well; however, other 
mathematical models like the Weibull distribution model can be used. The Bayesian 
updating method allows the updating of the probability density function for the material 
degradation. This stochastic model uses only the inspection data to extrapolate the 
material condition in the future and to estimate the optimal replacement and failure times. 
On the contrast, the deterministic models need large number of input data. The 
uncertainty created by imperfect inspections is taken into consideration in the stochastic 
risk based inspection model. The error in inspection is normally distributed with mean 
zero and a standard deviation that reflects the accuracy of the inspection method. The risk 
is calculated using the probability of failure due to material deterioration and the 
consequence is assessed in terms of the damage factor. The risk function is used to 
determine an optimal inspection and replacement interval. In this study, the risk based 
inspection model is used to determine the optimal inspection, replacement, and failure 
times for two cases of study: molecular sieve vessel, and distillate hydrotreater reactor. 
For the molecular sieve vessel the next inspection is due after 11 years from now, and for 
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the distillate hydrotreater reactor the next inspection is due after 10 years from now. The 
optimal inspection intervals given by the model for the case studies considered are 
reasonable; it is not too short so unnecessary inspections are avoided, nor it is too long so 
the risk of failure due to deterioration mechanisms will not become large. Applying the 
risk based model developed by Kallen (2002) gives slightly longer intervals for 
inspection. While applying the API risk based inspection model normally leads to much 
shorter inspection intervals; the API model usually recommends four or six years 
inspection intervals with different inspection activities regarding to the case studied. On 
the other hand, combining the two risk based models results in reliable inspection 
intervals that satisfies both features recommended by Kallen and the American Petroleum 
Institute (API). So we can certainly say that, results of the case studies presented in the 
study show that the method produces reliable estimates for the inspection intervals. The 
most important disadvantage of the method is that it is computationally exhaustive. For 
the molecular sieve vessel case study, the simulation using 500 samples took more than 
10 hours, while for the distillate hydrotreater reactor case study, it took around 8 hours on 
a personal computer with an Intel Pentium 4 and 256 MB RAM. On the other hand, the 
method can be easily programmed and does not need a large amount of input data. 
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APPENDIX A 
THE MATLAB CODE 
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A.l Case Study 1: Molecular Sieve Vessel 
The following MA TLAB code is developed to draw the prior and posterior density 
functions for perfect and imperfect inspection, and to estimate the optimal replacement 
and failure times. 
>> % component diameter [mmj 
>> d=2374; 
>> % actual thickness at service start [mm] 
>> th=20; 
>>% tensile strength [MPa] 
>> TS=448.16; 
>> % yeild strength [MPa] 
>> YS=206.84; 
>> % residual stress [MPa] 
>> S=min(l.l *(TS+YS)/2,TS); 
>> % operating pressure [MPa] 
>> OP=ll.l; 
>> % S coefficient of variation 
>> residualtress_cov=0.20; 
>> % pressure coefficient of variation 
>> pressure_cov=14; 
>> % standard deviation residual stress 
>> sigma_S=residual_cov*S; 
>> % standard deviation pressure 
>> sigma_pr=pressure_cov*OP; 
>> % coiTosion rate [mm/yr] 
>> CR=O.l; 
>> % coefficient of variation of CR 
>> cov=0.12; 
>>% coiTosion allowance [mmJ 
>> CorrAllowance = 4.0; 
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>>%times between past inspections 
>> t=[1986-1982 1992-1986 2000-1992]; 
>> % changes in wall thickness during these times 
>> D=[(th-19.7) (19.7-19.1) (19.1-18.2)]; 
>> % total number of inspections 
>> K=length(t); 
>> % cov for each inspection 
>> InspCOV=[0.5;0.5;0.5]; 
>> % standard deviation fpr each inspection 
>> SigmaEpsilon=InspCOV. *D'; 
>> % the grid for the normal density of the measurement error 
>> NormalLimit=round(max(SigmaEpsilon)* 1 000*3 )/1 000; 
>>cps=[ -Norma1Limit:0.001 :NormalLimit]; 
>> % built the gamma density estimation 
>> n=lOO; 
>> U= unifmd(0,1,n,1); 
>> G= zeros(n,1); 
>>for i=1:n 
if U(i)<=0.5 
G(i)=1 *CR; 
elseif U(i)>0.5 & U(i)<=0.8 
G(i)=2*CR; 
else 
G(i)=4*CR; 
end 
end 
>> Glnv = 1./G; 
>> y = gamfit(Glnv); 
>> a=y(1); 
>> b=1/y(2); 
>> % define the grid over which the densities are calculated 
>> GridDist=CR/20; 
>> x= GridDist:GridDist:7*CR; 
>> N=length(x); 
>> % the prior is given by: 
>>Prior= exp(a*log(b)-gammaln(a)+(-a-1)*log(x)-b./x); 
>> % find the posterior for one perfect inspection 
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>> A = a+t(K)/cov"2; 
>> B=b+D(K)/cov"2; 
>> PostPerflnsp = exp(A*log(B)-gammaln(A)+(-A-l)*log(x)-B./x); 
>> % find the posterior for one imperfect inspection 
>> n=2000; 
>> R=l; 
>> E = zeros(n,R); 
>> h = zeros(n,R); 
>>fork =l:R 
E(:,k) = normrnd(O,SigmaEpsilon(k),n,l); 
ifk==l 
h(:,k) = E(:,k); 
else 
h(:,k) = E(:,k)- E(:,k-1); 
end 
end 
>>likelihood= zeros(N,R); 
>> LikeliProd = zeros(N,l); 
>>for j=l:N 
for k=l:R 
likelihood(j,k) = (1/n)*sum(exp( -(t(k)/cov"2)*log(x(j)*cov"2)-
gammaln(t(k)/cov"2)+(t(k)/cov"2-l)*log(D(k)-min(D(k)-0.001,h(:,k)))-(D(k)-
min(D(k),h(:,k)))/(x(j)*cov"2))); 
end 
end 
>> LikeliProd = prod(likelihood,2); 
>> Postlmplnsp =Prior'. *LikeliProd/(Prior*LikeliProd*GridDist); 
>> PostlmplnspCDF = cumsum(Postlmplnsp)*GridDist; 
>>%find the posterior for two imperfect inspections 
>>R2=2; 
>> h2= zeros(n,R2); 
>> E2 = zeros(n,R2); 
>>for k2 =l:R2 
E2(:,k2) = normrnd(O,SigmaEpsilon(k2),n,l); 
ifk2==1 
h2(:,k2) = E2(:,k2); 
else 
h2(:,k2) = E2(:,k2)- E2(:,k2-l); 
end 
end 
>>likelihood= zeros(N,R2); 
>> LikeliProd = zeros(N,l); 
>>for j=l:N 
fork2=1:R2 
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likelihood2(j,k2) = (1/n)*sum( exp( -(t(k2)/covA2)*log(x(j)*covA2)-
gammaln(t(k2)/covA2)+(t(k2)/covA2-1)*log(D(k2)-min(D(k2)-
0.001,h2(:,k2)))-(D(k2)-min(D(k2),h2(:,k2)))/(x(j)*covA2))); 
end 
end 
>> LikeliProd2 = prod(likelihood2,2); 
>> Postlmplnsp2 =Prior'. *LikeliProd2/(Prior*LikeliProd2*GridDist); 
>> PostlmplnspCDF2 = cumsum(Postlmplnsp2)*GridDist; 
>> % find the posterior for three imperfect inspections 
>>R3=3; 
>> E3 = zeros(n,R3); 
>> h3= zeros(n,R3); 
>> for k3 =1 :R3 
E3(:,k3) = normrnd(O,SigmaEpsilon(k3),n,1); 
ifk3==1 
h3(:,k3) = E3(:,k3); 
else 
h3(:,k3) = E3(:,k3)- E3(:,k3-1); 
end 
end 
>>likelihood= zeros(N,R3); 
>> LikeliProd = zeros(N,1); 
>>for j=1:N 
fork3=1:R3 
likelihood3(j,k3) = (1/n)*sum(exp(-(t(k3)/covA2)*log(x(j)*covA2)-
gammaln(t(k3)/covA2)+(t(k3)/covA2-1)*log(D(k3)-min(D(k3)-
0.001,h3(:,k3)))-(D(k3)-min(D(k3),h3(:,k3)))/(xG)*covA2))); 
end 
end 
>> LikeliProd3 = prod(likelihood3,2); 
>> Postlmplnsp3 = Prior'. *LikeliProd3/(Prior*LikeliProd3*GridDist); 
>> PostlmplnspCDF3 = cumsum(Postlmplnsp3)*GridDist; 
>>%open a figue and plot the prior and posterior 
>> plot(x,Prior,'g-',x,PostPerflnsp,'k-',x,Postlmplnsp,'r-',x,Postlmplnsp2,'b-
',x,Postlmplnsp3,'c','LineWidth',2); 
>>grid 
>> legend('prior density','posterior 1 perf. insp.',['posterior',num2str(k),'imp. 
insp.'],['posterior',num2str(k2),'imp. insp.'],['posterior',num2str(k3),'imp. 
insp.'],O); 
>> title(['Prior and Posterior 
results(\sigma_\epsilon=',num2str(mean(SigmaEpsilon)),';n=',num2str(n),')']); 
>> xlabel('Corrosion Rate(mm/yr)'); 
>> ylabel('Density'); 
>>%built a function to calculate the expected time of preventive 
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>> % replacement. the expected time of failure and the time horizon over 
>>%which calculations are done 
>> % N is number of samples 
>>N=500; 
>> % p: normal distributed samples for pressure 
>> p= normrnd(OP,sigma_pr,N,1); 
>> % s: normal distributed samples for residual stress 
>> s = normmd(S,sigma_S,N,1); 
>> % m: vector of safety margins 
>> m = th-p*th./(2*s); 
>> c = zeros(N,1); 
>>for i=1:N 
u=unifmd(0,1); 
c(i) = x(min(find(PostimplnspCDF3>u))); 
end 
>> MaxT = max(m./c); 
>>rho = CorrAllowance./m; 
>> dT =1; 
>> PrepData = zeros(N,3); 
>>function y = simulprep(cov,m,rho,CR,dT,MaxT) 
>> a = 1/covA2; 
>> b = 1/(CR *covA2); 
>> ExpFailTime = 1-gammainc(b*m,a*dT); 
>> ExpReplTime = 1-gammainc(b*rho. *m,a*dT); 
>>for i=2*dT:dT:round(l.5*MaxT) 
ExpFailTime = ExpFailTime+i*(gammainc(b*m,a*(i-1 *dT))-
gammainc(b*m,a*i)); 
ExpReplTime = ExpReplTime+i*(gammainc(b*rho.*m,a*(i-1 *dT))-
gammainc(b*rho.*m,a*i)); 
end 
>> TimeHorizon = round(l.2*ExpFai1Time); 
>> y=[ExpReplTime ExpFailTime TimeHorizon]; 
>> G=y(:,2); 
>>%find The Optimal Inspection Time [yr] 
>> ar=lO*Prior. *x 
>> q=ar/th 
>> xx=x *ExpectedFailureTime; 
>> plot(xx,q,'LineWidth',2); 
>> title(['ar/t value vs. Equipment Age']); 
>> xlabel('Equipment Age (years)'); 
117 
>> ylabel('ar/t'); 
>> 1=1; 
>> 1nspection0=zeros(19, 1 ); 
>>for J=1:19 
if (J<=4) 
1=1; 
elseif (1==5) 
1=1+1; 
elseif (1==6) 
1=1+4; 
elseif (J==7) 
1=1+14; 
elseif (J==8) 
1=1+70; 
elseif (J==9) 
1=1+160; 
elseif (J==10) 
1=1+150; 
elseif (J==11) 
1=1+120; 
elseif (J==12) 
1=1+130; 
elseif (J==13) 
1=1+100; 
elseif (J==14) 
1=1+150; 
elseif ((J>14)&&(J<19)) 
1=1+150; 
else 
1=1+400; 
end 
1nspection0(J, 1 )=I; 
end 
>> 11=1; 
>> Inspectionl=zeros(l9,1); 
>>for J=1:19 
if (1<=5) 
Il=Il; 
elseif (J==6) 
Il=Il+l; 
elseif (1==7) 
11=11+4; 
elseif (J==8) 
11=11+14; 
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elseif (J==9) 
Il=I1+50; 
elseif (J==lO) 
Il=I1+40; 
elseif (J==ll) 
Il=I1+40; 
elseif (J==12) 
Il=I1+50; 
elseif ((J>12)&&(J<18)) 
Il=Il+lOO; 
else 
Il=I1+150; 
end 
Inspection! (J, 1 )=Il; 
end 
>> 12=1; 
>> Inspection2=zeros(19,1); 
>>for J=1:19 
if (J<=7) 
12=12; 
elseif (J==8) 
12=12+3; 
else if (J ==9) 
12=12+6; 
elseif ((J>9)&&(J<13)) 
12=12+10; 
elseif ((J>12)&&(J<17)) 
12=12+40; 
elseif ((J>l6)&&(J<19)) 
12=12+100; 
else 
12=12+270; 
end 
Inspection2(J ,1)=12; 
end 
>> 13=1; 
>> Inspection3=zeros(19,1); 
>>for J=1:19 
if (J<=8) 
I3=13; 
elseif ((J>8)&&(J<ll)) 
!3=13+2; 
else if (J == 11) 
13=13+1; 
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elseif (J==12) 
13=13+3; 
elseif (J==13) 
I3=I3+11; 
elseif (J == 14) 
I3=I3+30; 
elseif (J==15) 
I3=I3+10; 
elseif (J==16) 
I3=I3+20; 
elseif (J==17) 
I3=I3+50; 
elseif (J==18) 
I3=I3+120; 
else 
I3=I3+300; 
end 
Inspection) (J, 1 )=I3; 
end 
>> 14=1; 
>> lnspection4=zeros(19,1); 
>>for J=1:19 
if (J<=9) 
14=14; 
elseif (J==10) 
14=14+1; 
elseif (J==11) 
14=14; 
elseif (J==12) 
14=14+2; 
elseif (J==13) 
14=14+6; 
elseif (J==14) 
14=14+10; 
elseif (J==15) 
14=14+10; 
elseif (J==16) 
14=14+20; 
elseif (J == 17) 
14=14+50; 
else if (J ==18) 
14=14+120; 
else 
14=14+310; 
end 
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lnspection4(J,l)=l4; 
end 
>> 15=1; 
>> lnspection5=zeros(19,1); 
>>for J=1:19 
if (J<=lO) 
15=15; 
elseif (J==ll) 
15=15+1; 
elseif (J==l2) 
15=15+1; 
elseif (J==13) 
15=15+3; 
elseif (J==14) 
15=15+4; 
elseif (J==15) 
15=15+10; 
else if (J == 16) 
15=15+20; 
elseif ( J == 17) 
15=15+50; 
elseif (J==18) 
15=15+120; 
else 
15=15+290; 
end 
lnspection5(J,l)=l5; 
end 
>> 16=1; 
>> lnspection6=zeros(19,1); 
>>for J=1:19 
if (J<=ll) 
16=16; 
elseif (J==12) 
16=16+1; 
elseif (J==13) 
16=16+3; 
elseif (J==14) 
16=16+4; 
elseif (J==15) 
16=16+11; 
elseif (J==16) 
16=16+20; 
elseif (J == 17) 
121 
16=16+50; 
elseif (J==18) 
16=16+120; 
else 
16=16+290; 
end 
lnspection6(J, 1 )=16; 
end 
>>%Number of inspections=3. 
>> DamageFactor=zeros(1,140); 
>>for Z=1:140 
if (qqqq(Z)<=0.02) 
DF=Inspection3(1) 
elseif ((qqqq(Z)>0.02)&&(qqqq(Z)<=0.04)) 
DF=Inspection3(2) 
elseif ((qqqq(Z)>0.04)&&(qqqq(Z)<=0.06)) 
DF=Inspection3(3) 
else if (( qqqq(Z)>0.06)&&( qqqq(Z)<=0.08)) 
DF=Inspection3(4) 
elseif ((qqqq(Z)>0.08)&&(qqqq(Z)<=0.10)) 
DF=Inspection3(5) 
elseif ((qqqq(Z)>0.10)&&(qqqq(Z)<=0.12)) 
DF=Inspection3(6) 
elseif ((qqqq(Z)>0.12)&&(qqqq(Z)<=0.14)) 
DF=Inspection3(7) 
elseif ((qqqq(Z)>0.14)&&(qqqq(Z)<=0.16)) 
DF=Inspection3(8) 
elseif (( qqqq(Z)>0.16)&&( qqqq(Z)<=0.18)) 
DF=Inspection3(9) 
elseif ((qqqq(Z)>0.18)&&(qqqq(Z)<=0.20)) 
DF=Inspection3( 1 0) 
elseif ((qqqq(Z)>0.20)&&(qqqq(Z)<=0.25)) 
DF=Inspection3(11) 
else if (( qqqq(Z)>0.25)&&( qqqq(Z)<=0.30)) 
DF=Inspection3(12) 
else if (( qqqq(Z)>0.30)&&( qqqq(Z)<=0.35)) 
DF=Inspection3(13) 
elseif ((qqqq(Z)>0.35)&&(qqqq(Z)<=0.40)) 
DF=Inspection3(14) 
elseif (( qqqq(Z)>0.40)&&( qqqq(Z)<=0.45)) 
DF=Inspection3(15) 
elseif ( ( qqqq(Z)>O .45)&&( qqqq(Z)<=0.50)) 
DF=Inspection3(16) 
elseif ((qqqq(Z)>0.50)&&(qqqq(Z)<=0.55)) 
DF=Inspection3(17) 
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elseif ((qqqq(Z)>0.55)&&(qqqq(Z)<=0.60)) 
DF=Inspection3(18) 
else if (( qqqq(Z)>0.60)&&( qqqq(Z)<=0.65)) 
DF=Inspection3(19) 
end 
DamageFactor(l ,Z)=DF 
end 
>> plot(xx,DamageFactor,'LineWidth',2); 
>> title(['DamageFactor vs. Time']); 
>> xlabel('Time(year)'); 
>> ylabel('DamageFactor'); 
>> % Mean Expected Failure Time [yr] 
>> ExpectedFailureTime=mean(G) 
ExpectedFailureTime = 
199.0760 
>> % Minimum Expected Failure Time [yr] 
>> EFT=min(G) 
EFT= 
103.2876 
>> % find Expected Replacement Time [yr] 
>> J=y(:,1); 
>> ExpectedReplacementTime=mean(J) 
ExpectedReplacementTime = 
40.5072 
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A.2 Case Study 2: Distillate Hydrotreater Reactor 
The following MA TLAB code is developed to draw the prior and posterior density 
functions imperfect inspections, and to estimate the optimal replacement and failure 
times. 
>>clear 
>>%component diarnctcr [mrnl 
>> d= 3977; 
>> % actual thickness at service start lmm] 
>> th=40; 
>> % tensile strength IMPal 
>>TS=420; 
>>% yeild strength [MPaJ 
>> YS=350; 
>> % residual stress [MPal 
>> S=min(l.l *(TS+YS)/2,TS); 
>> rl(; operating pressure [MPa] 
>> 0P=4.7; 
>> <!(; S coefficient of variation 
>> residualstress_cov=0.25; 
>> <Jio pressure coefficient of variation 
>> pressure_cov=0.13; 
>> % standard deviation flow stress 
>> sigma_S=flowstress_cov*S; 
>> % standard deviation pressure 
>> sigma_pr=pressure_cov*OP; 
>>%corrosion rate [mm/vrj 
>> CR=0.19; 
>> c:1:) coefficient of variation of CR 
>> cov=0.6; 
>>%corrosion allowance lmmJ 
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>> CorrAllowance = 6.0; 
>> (1(; times between past inspections 
>> 1=[2002-1992 1992-1988]; 
>> (Ji; changes in wall thickness during these times 
>> D=[(th-38.9) (38.9-37.5)]; 
>> % total number of inspections 
>> K=length(t); 
>> % cov for each inspection 
>> InspCOV=[0.5;0.5]; 
>> % standard deviation fpr each inspection 
>> SigmaEpsilon=InspCOV. *D'; 
>> % the grid for the normal density of the measurement error 
>> NormalLimit=round(max(SigmaEpsilon)* 1 000*4 )11 000; 
>> eps=[-Norma1Limit:0.001:Norma1Limit]; 
>>%built the gamma density estimation 
>> n=lOO; 
>> U= unifmd(O,l,n,l); 
>> G= zeros(n,1); 
end 
>>for i=1:n 
else 
if U(i)<=0.5 
G(i)=1 *CR; 
elseif U(i)>0.5 & U(i)<=0.8 
G(i)=2*CR; 
G(i)=4*CR; 
end 
>> Glnv = 1./G; 
>> y = gamfit(Glnv); 
>> a=y(1); 
>> b=lly(2); 
>> % define the grid over which the densities are calculated 
>> GridDist=CR/20; 
>> x= GridDist:GridDist:7*CR; 
>> N=length(x); 
>>%the prior is given by: 
>>Prior= exp(a*log(b)-gammaln(a)+(-a-1)*log(x)-b./x); 
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>> % find the posterior for one perfect inspection 
>> A= a+t(K)/cov"2; 
>> B=b+D(K)/cov"2; 
>> PostPerflnsp = exp(A *log(B)-gammaln(A)+( -A-1)*log(x)-B./x); 
>> fJi; find the posterior for one imperfect inspection 
>> n=2000; 
>> R=1; 
>> E = zeros(n,R); 
>> h = zeros(n,R); 
>>fork =1:R 
end 
E(:,k) = normrnd(O,SigmaEpsilon(k),n,1); 
ifk==1 
h(:,k) = E(:,k); 
lse 
h(:,k) = E(:,k)- E(:,k-1); 
end 
>>likelihood= zeros(N,R); 
>> LikeliProd = zeros(N,1); 
>>for j=1:N 
for k=1:R 
likelihood(j,k) = (1/n)*sum( exp( -(t(k)/cov"2)*log(x(j)*cov"2)-
gammaln(t(k)/cov"2)+(t(k)/cov"2-1)*log(D(k)-min(D(k)-0.001,h(:,k)))-(D(k)-
min(D(k),h(: ,k)) )/(x(j)*cov"2) )); 
end 
end 
>> LikeliProd = prod(likelihood,2); 
>> Postlmplnsp = Prior'. *LikeliProdi(Prior*LikeliProd*GridDist); 
>> PostimpinspCDF = cumsum(Postlmpinsp)*GridDist; 
>>%find the posterior for two imperfect inspections 
>>R2=2; 
>> h2= zeros(n,R2); 
>> E2 = zeros(n,R2); 
>>for k2 =1:R2 
E2(:,k2) = normrnd(O,SigmaEpsilon(k2),n,1); 
ifk2==1 
h2(:,k2) = E2(:,k2); 
else 
h2(:,k2) = E2(:,k2)- E2(:,k2-1); 
end 
end 
>>likelihood= zeros(N,R2); 
>> LikeliProd = zeros(N,1); 
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>> for j==1 :N 
for k2==1 :R2 
likelihood2(j ,k2) == (1/n)*sum( exp( -(t(k2)/cov"2)*log(x(j)*cov"2)-
gammaln(t(k2)/cov"2)+(t(k2)/cov"2-1)*log(D(k2)-min(D(k2)-0.001,h2(:,k2)))-
(D(k2)-min(D(k2),h2(:,k2)))/(x(j)*cov"2))); 
end 
end 
>> LikeliProd2 == prod(likelihood2,2); 
>> Postlmplnsp2 ==Prior'. *LikeliProd2/(Prior*LikeliProd2*GridDist); 
>> % open a figue and plot: the prior and posterior 
>> plot(x,Prior,'g-',x,Postlmplnsp,'r-',x,Postlmplnsp2,'b-','LineWidth',2); 
>>grid 
>> legend('prior density',['posterior',num2str(k),'imp. insp.'] 
,['posterior' ,num2str(k2), 'imp. insp. '] ,0); 
>> title(['Prior and Posterior results (\sigma_\epsilon ==',num2str (mean 
(SigmaEpsilon)),';n==',num2str(n),')']); 
>> xlabel('Corrosion Rate(mm/yr)'); 
>> ylabel('Density (age%)'); 
>> t}b built a function to calculate the expected time of preventive 
>> <~7 replacement, the expected time of failure and the time horizon over which 
>> rk; calculations are done 
>> (k-~N is number of samples 
>>N=500; 
>> % p: normal distributed samples for pressure 
>> p= normrnd(OP,sigma_pr,N,1); 
>> % s: normal distributed samples for now stress 
>> s = normmd(S,sigma_S,N,1); 
>> % m: vector of safety margins 
>> m = th-p*th./(2*s); 
>> c = zeros(N,1); 
>> for i==1 :N 
u==unifmd(0,1); 
c(i) == x(min(find(PostlmplnspCDF2>u))); 
end 
>> MaxT == max(m./c); 
>>rho = CorrAllowance./m; 
>> dT =1; 
>> PrepData = zeros(N,3); 
>>function y == simulprep(cov,m,rho,CR,dT,MaxT) 
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>> a = 1/cov"2; 
>> b = 1/(CR *cov"2); 
>> ExpFailTime = 1-gammainc(b*m,a*dT); 
>> ExpReplTime = 1-gammainc(b*rho.*m,a*dT); 
>>for i=2*dT:dT:round(l.5*MaxT) 
ExpFailTime = ExpFailTime+i*(gammainc(b*m,a*(i-1 *dT))-
gammainc(b*m,a*i)); 
ExpReplTime = ExpReplTime+i*(gammainc(b*rho. *m,a*(i-1 *dT))-
gammainc(b*rho. *m,a*i)); 
end 
>> TimeHorizon = round(1.2*ExpFai1Time); 
>> y = [ExpReplTime ExpFailTime TimeHorizon]; 
>> G = y(:,2); 
>> % find The Optimal Inspection Time [yr] 
>> ar=10*Prior.*x 
>> q=ar/th 
>> xx=x *ExpectedFailureTime; 
>> plot(xx,q,'Line Width',2); 
>> title(['ar/t value vs. Equipment Age']); 
>> xlabel('Equipment Age (years)'); 
>> ylabel('ar/t'); 
>> 1=1; 
>> Inspection0=zeros(19,1); 
>>forJ=1:19 
if (J<=4) 
l=I; 
elseif (J==5) 
I=l+1; 
elseif (J==6) 
I=I+4; 
elseif (J==7) 
1=1+14; 
elseif (J==8) 
1=1+70; 
elseif (J==9) 
I=I+160; 
elseif (J==lO) 
I=l+150; 
elseif (J == 11) 
I=I+120; 
elseif (J==12) 
I=I+130; 
elseif (J==13) 
I=I+100; 
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elseif (J == 14) 
1=1+150; 
elseif ((J>14)&&(J<19)) 
1=1+150; 
else 
1=1+400; 
end 
InspectionO(J,1)=1; 
end 
>> 11=1; 
> > Inspection 1 =zeros( 19, 1); 
>>for J=1:19 
if (J<=5) 
11=11; 
elseif (J==6) 
11=11+1; 
elseif (J==7) 
11=11+4; 
elseif (J==8) 
11=11+14; 
elseif (J==9) 
11=11+50; 
elseif (J==lO) 
11=11+40; 
elseif (J==11) 
11=11+40; 
elseif (J==12) 
11=11+50; 
elseif ((J>12)&&(J<18)) 
11=11+100; 
else 
11=11+150; 
end 
lnspection1(J,1)=11; 
end 
>> 12=1; 
> > lnspection2=zeros(19, 1); 
>>for 1=1:19 
if (J<=7) 
12=12; 
elseif (J==8) 
12=12+3; 
elseif (J==9) 
12=12+6; 
elseif ((J>9)&&(J<13)) 
12=12+10; 
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elseif ((1>12)&&(1<17)) 
12=12+40; 
elseif ((1>16)&&(1<19)) 
12=12+100; 
else 
12=12+270; 
end 
lnspection2(1, 1 )=12; 
end 
>> 13=1; 
>> lnspection3=zeros(19,1); 
>>for 1=1:19 
if (1<=8) 
13=13; 
elseif ((1>8)&&(1<11)) 
13=13+2; 
elseif (1==11) 
13=13+1; 
elseif (1==12) 
13=13+3; 
elseif (1==13) 
13=13+11; 
elseif (1==14) 
13=13+30; 
elseif (1==15) 
13=13+10; 
elseif (1==16) 
13=13+20; 
else if ( 1 == 17) 
13=13+50; 
elseif (1==18) 
13=13+120; 
else 
13=13+300; 
end 
1nspection3(1, 1)=13; 
end 
>> 14=1; 
>> lnspection4=zeros(19,1); 
>>for 1=1:19 
if (1<=9) 
14=14; 
elseif (1==10) 
14=14+1; 
elseif (1==11) 
14=14; 
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elseif (J==12) 
14=14+2; 
elseif (1==13) 
14=14+6; 
elseif (J==14) 
14=14+10; 
elseif (J==15) 
14=14+10; 
elseif (1==16) 
14=14+20; 
elseif (J == 17) 
14=14+50; 
elseif (1==18) 
14=14+120; 
else 
14=14+310; 
end 
lnspection4(1 ,1)=14; 
end 
>> 15=1; 
> > lnspection5=zeros(l9, 1); 
>>for 1=1:19 
if(J<=lO) 
15=15; 
elseif (1==11) 
15=15+1; 
elseif (J==12) 
15=15+1; 
elseif (1==13) 
15=15+3; 
elseif (J==14) 
15=15+4; 
elseif (1==15) 
15=15+10; 
elseif (J==16) 
15=15+20; 
elseif (1==17) 
15=15+50; 
elseif (J==18) 
15=15+120; 
else 
15=15+290; 
end 
lnspection5(1, 1 )=15; 
end 
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>> 16=1; 
>> 1nspection6=zeros(19,1); 
>>for 1=1:19 
if (J<=ll) 
16=16; 
elseif (J==12) 
16=16+1; 
elseif (J==13) 
16=16+3; 
elseif (J==14) 
16=16+4; 
else if (J == 15) 
16=16+11; 
elseif (J==16) 
16=16+20; 
elseif (J==17) 
16=16+50; 
elseif (J==18) 
16=16+120; 
else 
16=16+290; 
end 
1nspection6(J,1)=16; 
end 
>> % Number of inspections=2. 
>> DamageFactor=zeros(1,140); 
>>for Z=1:140 
if (qqqq(Z)<=0.02) 
DF=Inspection2( 1) 
elseif ((qqqq(Z)>0.02)&&(qqqq(Z)<=0.04)) 
DF=Inspection2(2) 
elseif ((qqqq(Z)>0.04)&&(qqqq(Z)<=0.06)) 
DF=Inspection2(3) 
elseif (( qqqq(Z)>0.06)&&( qqqq(Z)<=0.08)) 
DF=Inspection2( 4) 
elseif (( qqqq(Z)>0.08)&&( qqqq(Z)<=0.1 0)) 
DF=1nspection2( 5) 
elseif ((qqqq(Z)>0.10)&&(qqqq(Z)<=0.12)) 
DF=Inspection2( 6) 
elseif ((qqqq(Z)>0.12)&&(qqqq(Z)<=0.14)) 
DF=Inspection2(7) 
elseif ((qqqq(Z)>0.14)&&(qqqq(Z)<=0.16)) 
DF=1nspection2(8) 
elseif ((qqqq(Z)>0.16)&&(qqqq(Z)<=0.18)) 
DF=1nspection2(9) 
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elseif ((qqqq(Z)>0.18)&&(qqqq(Z)<=0.20)) 
DF=Inspection2( 1 0) 
else if ( ( qqqq(Z)>0.20)&&( qqqq(Z)<=0.25)) 
DF=Inspection2(11) 
elseif ((qqqq(Z)>0.25)&&(qqqq(Z)<=0.30)) 
DF=Inspection2( 12) 
elseif ((qqqq(Z)>0.30)&&(qqqq(Z)<=0.35)) 
DF=Inspection2( 13) 
else if ( ( qqqq(Z)>0.3 5)&&( qqqq(Z)<=0.40)) 
DF=Inspection2( 14) 
elseif ((qqqq(Z)>0.40)&&(qqqq(Z)<=0.45)) 
DF=Inspection2( 15) 
elseif (( qqqq(Z)>0.45)&&( qqqq(Z)<=0.50)) 
DF=Inspection2( 16) 
elseif ((qqqq(Z)>0.50)&&(qqqq(Z)<=0.55)) 
DF=Inspection2(17) 
elseif (( qqqq(Z)>0.55)&&( qqqq(Z)<=0.60)) 
DF=Inspection2( 18) 
elseif (( qqqq(Z)>0.60)&&( qqqq(Z)<=0.65)) 
DF=Inspection2( 19) 
end 
DamageFactor( 1 ,Z)=DF 
end 
>> plot(xx,DamageFactor,'LineWidth',2); 
>> title(['DamageFactor vs. Time']); 
>> xlabel('Time(year)'); 
>> ylabel('DamageFactor'); 
>><~;Mean Expected Failure Time lyrJ 
>> ExpectedFailureTime = mean(G) 
ExpectedFailureTime = 209.9185 
>> 9(; Minirnum Expected Failure Time [yr] 
>>EFT= min(G) 
EFT = 209.0292 
>> <:1(, find Expected Replacement Time lyr] 
>> J = y(:,1); 
>> ExpectedReplacementTime = mean(J) 
ExpectedReplacementTime = 32.2589 
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Five factors were studied to see which are the factors that effect on the results (failure 
and replacement time) the most. The factors that were taken are the corrosion rate, 
corrosion allowance, pressure, diameter, and thickness. 
The software (Design Expert 6) was used, two factorial design was used so two 
values of each factor are taken (high and low values). Sixteen runs were carried on to find 
how the failure and replacement time will change with the change in the values of the 
input data; this is shown in Table B.l. 
Table B.l: Effect of changing the input data on the failure and replacement times. 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
A: Corrosion Rate B:Corrosion Allowance 
mmtyr mm 
0.05 4.00. 
0.15 4.00: 
0.05 
0.15 
0.05. 
0.15 4.00! 
0.05 8.00: 
0.15' 8.00' 
Factor 3 
C:Pressure 
GPa 
12.00 
12.00. 
Factor 4 
D:Diameter 
4000.00' 
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Factor 5 
E: Thickness 
mm 
45.00: 
Response 1 
Failure Time 
year 
297.16! 
Response 2 
Replacement Time 
year · 
55.11 
Table B .2 shows that just two factors have significant effect on the failure time. These 
factors are the corrsion rate and the thickness. It is found too that there is an interaction 
between these two factors ;i.e.the factors effected with each other; increasing the 
corrosion rate with decreasing the thickness leads to decrease the failure rate time. See 
figure B.l. 
Table B.2: ANOV A table for the failure time 
Response: Failure Time 
ANOV A for Selected Factorial Model 
Analysis of variance table [Partial sum of squares] 
Sum of 
Source Squares 
Model 1.42E+06 
A 6.30E+05 
E 6.29E+05 
AE 1.57E+05 
Residual 197.73 
Cor Total 1.42E+06 
Failure Time 
X= A: Corrosion Rate 
Y = E: Thickness 
900.62 
• E- 15.000 699.92 
.t.. E+ 45.000 
Actual Factors w 
B: Corrosion Allowance = 6.00 .~ 
C: Pressure= 6.50 1-
D: Diameter= 1500.00 ~ 499 · 2 .19 
~ 
298.519 
97.818 
DF Mean Square F Value 
3 4.72E+05 28645.3 
1 6.30E+05 38202.3 
1 6.29E+05 38188.3 
1 1.57E+05 9545.33 
12 16.48 
15 
E: Thickness 
0.05 0.07 0.10 0.13 
A: Corrosion Rate 
Prob. > F 
< 0.0001 
< 0.0001 
< 0.0001 
< 0.0001 
0.15 
Figure B.1: Effect of changing the corrosion rate and material 
thickness on the failure time 
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For the replacement time Table B.3 shows that two factors have siginficant effect on 
the response. These factors are the corrosion rate and corrosion Alowance. It is also 
found that there is an interaction between the two factors. See figure B.2. 
Table B.3: ANOVA table for the replacement time 
Response: Replacement Time 
ANOV A for Selected Factorial Model 
Analysis of variance table [Partial sum of squares] 
Sum of Mean F 
Source Squares DF Square Value Prob.>F 
Model 39827.7 3 13275.9 1.97E+08 < 0.0001 
A 25606.1 1 25606.1 3.80£+08 < 0.0001 
B 11376.5 1 11376.5 1.69£+08 < 0.0001 
AB 2845.07 1 2845.07 4.22£+07 < 0.0001 
Residual 8.08E-04 12 6.74E-05 
Cor Total 39827.7 15 
Increasing the corrosion rate with decreasing the corrosion allowance leads to decrease 
the replacement time. 
Replacement Time 
X= A: Corrosion Rate 
Y = B: Corrosion Allowance 
• B· 4.000 
A 8+8.0[1(1 
Actual Factors 
C: Pressure= 6.50 
D: Diameter= 1500.00 
E: Thickness = 30.00 
(L) 
E 
i= 
c 
(L) 
161.8 
128.461 
E95.1218 
(L) 
w 
ro Q_ 
(L) 
0:: 
61.7828 
28.4437 
B: Corrosion Allowance 
... 
0.05 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.15 
A: Corrosion Rate 
Figure B.2: Effect of changing the corrosion rate and corrosion 
allowance on the optimal replacement time 
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